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ABSTRACT 
 
AN APPLICATION OF PROSPECT THEORY ON ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC 
VOTING: THE EFFECT OF INCUMBENCY ON REFERENCE POINT 
Masters of Arts, 2015 
Özge Kemahlıoğlu, Thesis Supervisor 
Keywords: Strategic Voting, Prospect Theory, Loss Aversion, Reference Point 
Dependency 
 
Prospect theory is one of the most influential decision making theories in social 
sciences. However, it has been ignored by the literature of strategic voting in which 
expected utility theory is widely preferred. In this study, I apply two claims of prospect 
theory, reference point dependency and loss aversion, on the analysis of strategic 
voting. The purpose of this study is to understand the impact of voter’s reference point 
on the probability that a voter casts strategic vote in election. Hypotheses are derived 
from a formal model which incorporates reference point and loss aversion into the 
analysis of strategic voting. The model predicts that voters, whose most preferred party 
or candidate is the incumbent, are more prone to vote strategically than voters, whose 
least preferred party or candidate is the incumbent. In addition to this, when the place of 
the incumbent in preference ranking of the voter in which, voter ranks 
parties/candidates in order of preference, increases; probability of strategic voting 
increases as well. To test these predictions, experiments were conducted with student 
and farmer subjects. Also, statistical analyses were done with survey data from the 2015 
British Election Studies (BES) for the 2010 and the 2015 UK General Elections. Results 
from experiments and statistical analyses provide support for predictions of this study. 
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Özet 
 
STRATEJİK OY VERME DAVRANIŞI ANALİZİNE BİR BEKLENTİ TEORİSİ 
UYGULAMASI: İKTİDARIN REFERANS NOKTASINA ETKİSİ 
Faruk Aksoy 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı Tezi, 2015 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Stratejik oy, Beklenti Teorisi, Kayıp Hoşnutsuzluğu, Referans 
noktasına bağımlılık 
 
Sosyal bilimlerde Beklenti teorisi (Prospect Theory) karar alma süreçlerini 
açıklayan en etkili teorilerden birisidir. Ancak, beklenen fayda(expected utility) 
teorisinin sıkça kullanıldığı stratejik oy verme davranışı üzerine yapılmış çalışmalarda 
ihmal edilegelmiştir. Bu çalışmada, beklenti teorisinin iki temel savı olan referans 
noktasına bağlımlılık(reference point dependency) ve kaybetme hoşnutsuzluğu (loss 
aversion) stratejik oy verme davranışının analizine eklemlenmektedir. Bu çalışmadaki 
temel amaç, seçmenin referans noktasının stratejik oy verme ihtimali üzerini etkisini 
araştırmaktır. Referans noktası bağımlılığı ve kaybetme hoşnutsuzluğunun uygulandığı 
bir modelden iki ana hipotez türetilmiştir. Buna göre, seçim öncesinde, en çok tercih 
ettiği parti(the most preferred party) yada aday iktidarda olan seçmenlerin, en az tercih 
ettiği parti(the least preferred party) yada aday iktidarda olan seçmenlere nazaran 
stratejik oy vermeye daha meyilli olması beklenmektedir. Bununla birlikte, iktidardaki 
parti yada adayın, seçmenin partileri/adayları onlara hissettiği yakınlığa göre 
konumlardırdığı sıralamadaki yeri yükseldikçe, seçmenin stratejik oy verme ihtimalinin 
artması beklenmektedir. Bu tahminleri test etmek için öğrenci ve çiftçilerin katıldığı 
deneyler yapılmıştır. Ayrıca, 2015 British Election Studies anket verileri kullanılarak 
2010 ve 2015 Birleşik Krallık Genel Seçimleri için istatistiksel analizler yapılmıştır. 
Deneylerin ve istatistiksel analizlerin sonuçları hipotezleri destekler niteliktedir.    
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Strategic voting, which traditionally means casting one’s vote for the second 
most preferred party or candidate, is one of the most studied topics in the literature of 
voting behavior. Scholars mostly seek to find conditions that make strategic voting a 
more beneficial option for voters. Effects of different electoral systems, electoral 
expectations, institutional setting, personality etc… on the probability that people cast 
their vote strategically, are widely discussed in the literature. Also, formal models are 
very common to theorize strategic voting. In fact, expected utility theory is the main 
tool to model strategic voting. However, the assumptions of expected utility theory have 
been criticized by psychological oriented theories when explaining human behavior. 
One of the most common psychological based theories which criticize these 
assumptions is prospect theory which is applied throughout various fields in social 
science for various issues. However, in strategic voting literature, prospect theory has 
been ignored by scholars, in this study; there will be an application of prospect theory to 
the analysis strategic voting. This application offers a new condition, satisfaction level 
from status-quo, which alters the probability of strategic voting. Applying prospect 
theory offers a new insight from a different perspective when analyzing strategic voting 
as a political behavior. 
Two interrelated concepts of prospect theory might help to explain strategic 
voting. According to prospect theory, when people choose among alternative options, 
they evaluate these options and their expected outcomes as loses and gains. Besides, to 
determine losses and gains, people resort to a reference point which is a natural zero 
point. If the expected outcome of an option is worse than reference point, it is coded as 
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loss. On the other hand, if it is higher than the reference point, it is coded as a gain. This 
distinction becomes more meaningful when the second concept of prospect theory is 
included into the argument. People give more importance to avoiding expected losses 
than increasing their expected gains. This is called loss aversion which is depicted by 
motto that “loss looms larger than gain”. So, in more generic terms, people are more 
prone to choose the option which ensures to avoid expected loss over the option that 
increases possible gain even the expected utility of latter is higher than the former. 
Evaluating options regarding reference point and loss aversion takes several forms in 
different applications which will be discussed in detail in next paragraphs. 
How can this argument be applied to the analysis of strategic voting? First of all, 
a reference point should be defined to analyze strategic voting according to prospect 
theory. One possible conceptualization of the reference point might be the following: 
Each voter has a preference ranking in which parties or candidates are listed in an order 
as the most preferred party, the second most preferred party, the third most preferred 
party etc… The satisfaction level of the voter increases when the place of the incumbent 
on voter’s preference ranking increases. In other words, the incumbency of the most 
preferred party
1
 is the ideal condition for the voter. When the status-quo drifts apart 
from the ideal condition, the satisfaction level of the voter decreases. So, the distance of 
status-quo to the ideal position is defined as the satisfaction level of the voter. It is the 
reference point for the voter when she decides in the next election. She compares 
expected outcomes of the election with her pre-election satisfaction level before 
deciding the party that she votes 
This argument reveals the research question of this study. What is the effect of 
voter’s satisfaction level, in other words the reference point, on her probability of voting 
strategically? Under the specific conditions in which strategic voting is a reasonable 
option,  people are more prone to vote strategically when they have higher reference 
point, or higher satisfaction level from the status-quo. In upcoming paragraphs there 
will be detailed explanation of proposed mechanism and there will be a formal model in 
which attributes of prospect theory are applied.  
                                                 
1
 Analysis is applicable to both elections that parties compete and elections that candidates compete. So, 
party and candidate will be used interchangeably in first chapter.   
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In this chapter, there will be a proper definition and a literature review of 
strategic voting. Also, there will be a detailed description of prospect theory and a brief 
review of the literature as well. Then, the application of prospect theory will be 
explained in detail and it will be backed up with a formal model. Lastly in this chapter, 
testable hypotheses will be derived from the formal model. 
In second chapter, an experimental study which was conducted with student and 
farmer subjects will be presented. Some of the hypotheses which are derived from the 
model will be tested within the experiment. In the third chapter, there will be an analysis 
of the UK parliamentary elections via the British Election Study dataset in which 
hypotheses of this study are tested. Lastly, there will be a conclusion chapter to sum up 
all of the arguments and findings. 
1.1 What is strategic voting? 
The definition of strategic voting is a package which necessarily explains why 
and when people vote strategically. Modern explanations of strategic voting depend on 
the Law of Duverger. The famous theory of Duverger states that countries which have 
plurality rule elections with single member districts tend to have two-party systems 
(Duverger, 1954). Two mechanisms embedded in plurality rule triggers this outcome. 
The first one is called the mechanic effect. Plurality rule with single member district 
favors large parties because, in each constituency, there is only one seat to allocate 
which is reserved for the party which wins the plurality of the votes. It means that there 
is an absolute winner in the election. On the other hand, since other parties win nothing, 
they are absolute losers. This feature of plurality rule with single member-districts 
affects the voting behavior of the electorate. This is called the psychological effect. 
Voters who support parties that have no chance to win the election know that if they 
vote for their most preferred party, they waste their vote since; their party cannot win 
any representation in plurality elections with single member district. Therefore, they 
vote for the party which has the credible expectation of the voters to win elections and 
its policy position is closer to her policy position than the other large party. This 
mechanism leads to two major parties dominating most of the seats in the legislature. 
Voters of parties which are not expected to gain first two seats in the election, vote for 
one of the effective parties regarding their preferences. Thus, votes aggregate for two 
parties in every election which naturally leads to a two party systems. All in all, people 
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vote for the most preferred effective party so as not to waste their votes by voting for 
their most preferred party.   
 In fact, strategic voting was properly defined by Downs. He argues that people 
consider the winning probabilities of parties and their preference toward these parties 
(Downs, 1957). What this means is, if the party that the voter most prefer has no chance 
to win elections, she may choose to vote for another party which has a higher chance of 
winning election and which she simultaneously prefers over other parties. This is called 
strategic voting. 
 As it can be deduced from the above-mentioned definition, only a subset of 
voters has an incentive to vote strategically. So, it is a viable option only for some of the 
voters. Who are those voters? An important part of the literature seeks to define the 
voters that have incentives for strategic voting. For example, Blais and Nadeau argue 
that people vote strategically when their most preferred candidate is expected to be 
placed last in the elections in which there are three competing candidates (Blais, 1996). 
Alvarez et al. state that voters whose most preferred candidate has a lower expected 
vote share than the second most preferred candidate are the subset that have an 
incentive to vote strategically (Alvarez; 2000). Most of these studies focus on the 
expected electoral standing of the most preferred party of the voter to define her as a 
probable strategic voter. Current studies in the literature redefine the meaning of 
“winning” the election. This leads to a change in the definition of strategic voting and 
voters that have an incentive to vote strategically. The reason behind this redefinition is 
to reveal the voters’ probability of voting strategically under different electoral systems. 
For instance, people might vote strategically in PR systems to influence post electoral 
coalition formation especially where multi-party coalitions are common. This is called 
tactical coalition voting (Blais, 2014). The same phenomenon was underlined by Cox 
who states that people may conduct portfolio maximizing behavior rather than seat 
maximizing one. This means that they may consider the possible coalition options when 
they decide to vote. Therefore, people may vote strategically for another party other 
than their most preferred party to increase the chance of their most preferred party being 
in a coalition (Cox, 1997). Another example might be threshold insurance voting by 
which voters try to ensure that a prospective smaller coalition partner can reach the 
electoral threshold (Blais, 2014).  
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 Thus, strategic voting is not just an electoral tool which people can use only 
when their most preferred party has little chance to win the election. There are a number 
of considerations which people consider when voting strategically to reach a better 
electoral outcome; it is not only winning the election. Strategic voting is a type of 
electoral behavior which depends on an attitude that praises strategic consideration. In 
this respect, one of the most impressive definitions of strategic voting is stated by 
Abrahamson et al (2010). Sincere voting is to vote for the most preferred party without 
considering the possible outcomes of the election. It means that sincere voters act 
according to only their preferences towards parties. On the other hand, strategic voting 
means that voter evaluates all possible outcomes and their probabilities and casting their 
vote to reach the best outcome as much as possible (Abrahamson et al., 2010). They use 
the term tactical vote to explain voting for a party than the most preferred party. In that 
case, voting for the most preferred party might be a type of strategic voting as well if it 
is the best option among others. This is actually called a straightforward vote 
(Farquaharson, 1969).  
 So, the answers for the question of who votes strategically have expanded in the 
literature in recent years. The reason behind this expansion is observations that cannot 
be explained by a narrow definition of strategic voting, and related to this, other 
conditions that alter the probability of strategic voting. There will be a review of some 
of these conditions in the next section.  
Nevertheless, in this study, the traditional definition of strategic voting will be 
used. Besides, to identify voters who have incentive to vote strategically, a necessary 
condition for strategic voting is defined: The most preferred party of the voter needs to 
have less chance of winning election than her second most preferred party and at least 
one more party should have higher expected vote share than the voter’s most preferred 
party. If the voter casts a vote for her second most preferred party under this 
circumstance, then this is called strategic voting. I will elaborate why strategic voting is 
defined as such in the next section where conditions that alter the probability of 
strategic voting will be discussed. 
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1.2 Conditions that alter the probability of strategic voting: 
1.2.1 Electoral Expectations: 
 To review some of these conditions, I will classify them into four categories. 
The first group of conditions is the electoral expectations. Actually, there are two 
important types of electoral expectations that are discussed with respect to their effects 
on voter’s probability of voting strategically. The fist one is marginality. Marginality 
implies the vote share margin between the leading and runner-up candidates. For 
instance, in a three candidate race, marginality corresponds to the expected vote share 
difference between the candidate that is expected to finish the competition first and the 
candidate that is expected to finish the competition second. There are different 
arguments about the effect of this margin on the voter’s probability of voting 
strategically. Suppose that three candidates participate in the election and the voter’s 
most preferred candidate is the one who has the least chance to win the election. Also, 
voter’s second most preferred candidate is the one who is expected to be the runner-up 
in the election. The general tendency of the literature suggests that when the margin 
between the leading candidate and the runner-up decreases, the voter’s probability of 
casting a strategic vote increases (Fisher, 2002). If the race between the leader and the 
runner-up candidates is close, voters of the trailer candidate feel that their vote might 
change the outcome of elections and consequently be more inclined to vote 
strategically.  However, Myatt (2000) argues that when this margin increases, voters of 
the trailer candidate are more prone to cast strategic vote especially in large 
constituencies (Myatt, 2000a). In other words, the perception that other people will vote 
strategically decreases the voter’s probability of voting strategically (Myatt, 1999a). In 
this line of argument, the assumption that the common knowledge about vote share is 
deployed. Therefore, individuals cannot be sure all together who the leading candidate 
is. Thus, others’ strategic voting is a negative feedback which makes the individual 
voter less inclined to vote strategically (Myatt, 1999b).   
The second type of expectation is the distance from contention. It refers to the 
expected vote share difference between the most preferred party and the second most 
preferred party in the given example in the last paragraph. When distance from 
contention increases, voters of the trailer candidate are more prone to vote strategically 
(Myatt, 2014). 
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1.2.2 System Characteristics: 
One of the most discussed topics about the conditions that alter the voter’s 
probability of voting strategically is the electoral system of the country. Originally, 
Duvergian causal explanation for strategic voting focuses on plurality elections with 
low district magnitude. So, strategic voting is depicted as a part of plurality elections. In 
his seminal work, Cox states that proportional representation vanishes strategic voting 
especially where the district magnitude is more than five (Cox, 1997). If district 
magnitude is more than five, people cannot obtain clear information about the possible 
seat allocation.  But, as it was indicated, voter may show portfolio maximizing behavior 
with considering coalition possibilities rather than showing seat maximizing behavior. 
Still, according to Cox, first past the post systems exhibit a more suitable environment 
for strategic voting. This attitude in the literature caused an enrichment of definitions of 
strategic voting. In fact, some studies argue that proportional electoral rules and 
plurality rule are equally suitable for strategic voting (Abrahamson et al, 2010).  
There are also some studies which analyze strategic voting in some other 
electoral systems. For example, scholars analyze strategic voting behavior in majority 
run-off elections and they reach different results. Some scholars suggest that in the first 
round, people are more prone to vote sincerely and even their most preferred candidate 
is the trailer one because they have a chance to coordinate against the least preferred 
candidate in the second round (Martinelli, 2002). Others argue that people may cast 
strategic vote in the first round as well to choose the candidate which their most 
preferred candidate will compete with in the second round (Bouton, 2015).  
Moreover, effects of other electoral institutions on voter’s likelihood of voting 
strategically are examined in the literature. For example, Blais and Erişen argue that 
when the electoral threshold in a country increases, incentives for voting strategically 
increase as well (Blais & Erişen, 2014). Also, as it was discussed in the previous part, 
there is a type of strategic voting which is defined as threshold insurance voting (Blais, 
2014).    
Another systemic factor that alters the voter’s probability of voting strategically 
is the democratic conditions of the country. It is the general argument that in 
consolidated democracies, people are more prone to vote strategically (Scheiner, 2009). 
In new democracies and in countries that have poorly institutionalized party systems, 
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citizens are less inclined to vote strategically (Scheiner, 2009). All these arguments 
depend on the fact that in consolidated democracies and in countries which have 
institutionalized party systems, identifying the political position of candidates is easier. 
There are more information channels for voters to learn about candidates and their 
expected vote shares in election. It means that people can predict who the challenger is 
or which party’s policy position is closer to them. Thus, they are able to determine 
whether strategic voting is a better option or not. However, there are some counter 
arguments. For example, Duch and Palmer (2002) suggest that voters in Hungary, a 
post-communist democracy, tend to cast strategic votes as the Duvergian law suggests. 
Voters abandon small parties to strategically vote for larger parties (Duch, 2002).     
Media are another important factor in democratic processes. As it can be 
predicted, the effect of media on voter’s probability of voting strategically is another 
issue which is discussed in the literature. The most prominent finding of the literature is 
that when an individual voter believes that media can influence other voters’ decision, 
she is more prone to vote strategically (Cohen, 2009).So, if an individual believes that 
media is capable of persuading other voters, her probability of casting a strategic vote 
increases.       
1.2.3 Individual level characteristics: 
The most recognized individual characteristic which alters voter’s likelihood of 
voting strategically is the strength of the party affiliation of the voter. It is well 
documented in the literature that when the strength of a voter’s affiliation towards her 
most preferred party increases, she is less prone to vote strategically. Also, when her 
strength of affiliation towards her second most preferred party increases, it is more 
probable that she casts a strategic vote (Blais; 1996). Another finding in the literature 
about party affiliation suggests that non-partisans and weak or small party’s voters are 
more prone vote strategically (Blais, 2010). 
There are some other studies which focus on different individual characteristics 
of the voters. For instance, Erişen and Blais suggest that personality traits of voters 
affect their inclination to cast a strategic vote. They argue that openness to experience 
and emotional stability as personality traits increase the voter’s likelihood of voting 
strategically, because these personality traits help people making rational calculations. 
On the other hand, agreeableness decreases the likelihood of the voter to vote 
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strategically since agreeable people make less rational calculations and conduct less 
competitive behavior. (Erişen, 2014).     
1.2.4 Party characteristics:     
There are not many studies on how characteristics of parties in a political system 
affect the likelihood of voters to vote strategically. One of the arguments about the 
relationship between strategic voting and party characteristic is about ethnic parties. 
Studies suggest that voters of ethnic parties are more prone to vote sincerely because; 
they do not care about winning elections (Chandra, 2009). But, Chandra (2009) argues 
that those voters may cast strategic votes especially in countries where patronage 
politics is highly prominent in the political setting. It is because, in such democracies, 
citizens are highly dependent on the state resources and therefore, they have greater 
incentive not to waste their vote (Chandra, 2009). Another argument about party 
characteristic can be found in the paper of Magaloni in which she analyzes PRI survival 
in Mexico. She argues that there is no reason for opposition voters to cast strategic vote 
for the strongest opposition party since there was no clue about the decline of the 
hegemonic party in Mexico (Magaloni, 2008).  
The incumbency of the most preferred party or candidate is a type of condition 
that alters the probability of the voter to vote strategically. It is also a type of party or 
candidate characteristic. This study contributes to the strategic voting literature in two 
respects. Firstly, it introduces a type of party characteristic that alters the voter’s 
likelihood of voting strategically. Secondly, it applies prospect theory on the decision 
making process of strategic voting. Besides, the model in this paper despite the fact that 
it is simple and incomplete, is the first attempt to model strategic voting with prospect 
theory rather than expected utility theory. It tries to introduce a voting function that is 
converted into a value function which has attributes of prospect theory.  
1.3 Conceptualization: 
In this study, I will try to represent a different conceptualization of strategic 
voting. As it was explained in the preceding review, there is a necessary condition for 
the voter to cast a strategic vote: The most preferred party of voter must have less 
chance for winning the election than her second most preferred party and there should 
be at least one more party which has a higher expected vote share than the most 
preferred party. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the voter to cast a 
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strategic vote. All other conditions that were discussed are neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions. However, when some of them are combined with this necessary 
condition, their combination is sufficient for voter to cast strategic vote. These 
conditions are defined as INUS conditions (Mahoney, 2009). If a necessary condition is 
supplied with a group of these conditions, it makes them all together sufficient to lead a 
particular outcome. For example, if the most preferred party of the voter has less chance 
of winning the election than her second most preferred party, it means that the necessary 
condition occurs. However, it may not be enough for the voter to vote for her second 
most preferred party. If the expected vote share difference between her most preferred 
party and her second most preferred party is high enough and she also has an 
emotionally stable personality, then it is more likely that she may vote strategically. On 
the other hand, if her most preferred party has a chance to win the election, strategic 
voting is not a rational option for her. Originally, INUS cause argument is defined as a 
deterministic explanation, but it may be possible to convert it to a probabilistic 
explanation. If necessary condition occurs, then each new added INUS condition 
increases the voter’s likelihood of voting strategically. Besides, it might be possible that 
specific combinations of INUS causes may increase or decrease the likelihood of the 
voter to vote strategically. For example, in a country where electoral threshold and PR 
rules are implemented, occurrence of the necessary condition may increase voter’s 
probability of voting strategically, but in a country where electoral threshold and 
majority run-off rules are implemented occurrence of the necessary condition of 
strategic voting may decreases the likelihood of the voter to vote strategically. Also, 
combination of INUS causes may increase or decreases each other effects on strategic 
voting. 
Incumbency of the most preferred candidate is also type of INUS cause. It needs 
the necessary cause to show its effect on strategic voting. Also, it might affect and be 
affected by other INUS causes. So, the hypothesis is that incumbency of the most 
preferred party increases the probability of strategic voting of the individual voter; also, 
there might be relationships between other INUS variables and the incumbency of the 
most preferred candidate. It is useful a way to see whether there are spillover effects 
between variables and in this way possible multicollinearity between independent 
variables can be detected.  
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It is important to highlight that all variables have separate causal relationships 
with the dependent variable. A combination of them just increases the probability of the 
occurrence of the dependent variable. The combination does not necessarily have 
separate causal explanation, it just increases the probability. As I will discuss in the next 
section, in this study prospect theory is applied to explain the relationship between the 
incumbency of the most preferred party and strategic voting.                    
1.4 Prospect Theory: 
Rational choice theory for decision making is a widely applied framework in 
political science. One of the variants of rational choice theory is expected utility theory 
which explains individual’s choices with respect to the probability of occurrence of 
events and the utility that individual takes from them. Expected utility theory assumes 
that people make rational calculations when they choose an option over others: When 
people make choice among different options, they calculate the expected utility of each 
option. To do this, they multiply the probability of the occurrence of an outcome with 
the subjective utility that people gain from this particular outcome. This calculation is 
made for each probable outcome of an option. Then, results of these multiplications are 
summed up to calculate expected utility from choosing an option. To decide between 
options, they compare the expected utilities of these options. After the comparison, they 
choose the option which has the highest expected utility. It is still the most preferred 
theory in social sciences, political science and strategic voting literature. 
However, there are several theories that criticize the assumptions of expected 
utility theory. Some of them do not give up these assumptions, but they propose that the 
validity of these assumptions depend on the availability of viable information when 
making rational calculations and people’s willingness to pay attention to the issue. So, if 
there is not enough and viable information to make a rational calculation and if they do 
not have enough time and/or energy to make these calculations, the assumptions of 
expected utility theory becomes void.  
Most of the theories that criticize expected utility theory are psychologically 
oriented theories. These theories underline the cognitive capacity and biases of human 
beings. One of the foremost psychologically oriented theories is bounded rationality. It 
suggests that some of the cognitive biases may prevent people from making rational 
calculations when they need to choose over alternatives (Simon, 1955). 
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Like others, prospect theory provides one of the most important theoretical 
criticisms of expected utility theory. Comparing properties of prospect theory with 
expected utility theory might be a good way to explain prospect theory itself. First of 
all, prospect theory defines decision problems. A decision problem consists of options, 
possible outcomes and the consequences of these options and probabilities of 
occurrence for these outcomes of options. It is the same in expected utility. To predict 
the act, outcomes of options are multiplied by their probabilities and then they are 
summed up. Then, expected utilities of options are compared. The option that has the 
higher utility is predicted as being the expected behavior. Prospect theory assigns 
weighting function for probabilities and the value function for options and outcomes of 
which the properties and the way in which they are different than their counterparts in 
expected utility theory.  
Firstly, prospect theory diverges from expected utility in terms of the decision 
maker’s perception of the decision problem. It defines decision frames in which 
decision makers construct conceptions about options, outcomes and probabilities 
regarding the formulation of the decision problem, norms, habits and personal 
characteristics. The decision of the voter depends on these frames.  
 The concept of decision frames is against the assumption of transitivity of 
expected utility theory. This means that a rational individual decides according to a 
consistent preference ranking in each instance. Preference ranking does not change due 
to the formulation of a problem. However, series of experimental studies find evidence 
that the preferences of people may reverse. The utility from a particular option may 
change for an individual even if the expected utility of that option stays the same under 
different conceptualizations of the same problem.  
According to prospect theory, the reference point of a decision problem is a key 
for voter’s preference reversal. The reference point refers to the current real or 
hypothetical status of the commodity which will change according to individual’s 
decision. It divides outcomes of options as gains and losses with respect to a natural 
zero point. For example, the salary of a decision maker in her previous job is the 
reference point when she evaluates the salaries which are offered to her by different 
companies. If the offer is higher than the salary that she was paid in her previous job, 
she perceives herself in a gain frame. However, if the offer is lower than the salary that 
13 
 
she was paid in her previous job, she perceives herself in a loss frame. So, if a particular 
outcome is below the reference point, it is coded as a loss and if it is above the reference 
point, it is coded as a gain. Prospect theory suggests that the magnitude of a reference 
point affects the decision of people. The reason behind this is that people are more 
sensitive towards losses than gains. So, losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman, 
1981). This is called loss aversion. Thus, when the reference point of an individual 
changes, her decision for the very same problem might change as well. Also, people are 
more risk averse in the gain domain and they engage more risk seeking behavior in the 
loss domain. 
Another criticism towards expected utility theory is about invariance. This 
means that the decision of the individual should not depend on how outcomes and 
probabilities are described. So that framing of outcomes and probabilities should not 
change the preferences. But, prospect theory suggests that framing matters. The ratio-
difference principle is one of the explanations for how and why framing the options 
may change the preferences of people. The ratio-difference principle suggests that the 
impact of positive differences of two values diminishes when their ratio decreases. For 
example, the difference between 10 and 20 percent is higher than difference between 80 
and 90 percent since  
20
10
>
90
80
 . So, it is more effective to say that the unemployment rate 
decreases from 20% to 10% than saying that the employment rate increases from 80% 
to 90%. Even if these differences objectively have the same value, framing makes the 
former change more valuable than the letter change which may cause preference 
reversal
2
. It is a property of both value and weighting functions.     
All these properties are reflected in an S shaped value function. It is concave 
above the reference point and convex below it. Also, it is steeper below the reference 
point than above it. This means that the difference between 100 and 120 has lower 
subjective value than the difference between 0 and 20. This is called diminishing 
sensitivity and it is explained by the ratio-difference principle. Additionally, value 
difference between -10 and -20 is higher than value difference between 10 and 20 since 
the value function is steeper under the reference point. This is called loss aversion. 
  Another divergence of prospect theory from expected utility theory is about 
probabilities of occurrence. Rather than evaluating probabilities with their objective 
                                                 
2
  See Problem 9 and 10 in Analysis of Political Choices. 
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values, prospect theory offers decision weights. This is represented as a weighting 
function. The basic characteristic of a weighting function is that it over weights low 
probabilities, while it under weights middle and high probabilities. Therefore, people 
perceive low probabilities higher than their objective values while they perceive high 
and overall probabilities lower than their objective values. This is called as the 
conservatism bias which is one of the most studied cognitive biases (Hilbert, 2012). 
Also, the weighting function does not behave well at the edges. It means that if the 
probability of the outcomes turns impossibility to possibility or possibility to certainty, 
it has more impact on the decision (Fox, 2000). So, if a probability increases from 0% to 
1% and from 99 percent to 100 percent, this change is perceived as higher than its 
objective value. This is called bounded subadditivity (Tversky, 2000). 
In previous paragraphs, there was a description of prospect theory depending on 
how it differs from expected utility theory. From this point on, there will be a 
description of how this process operates as a mechanism. Prospect theory divides 
decision making process into two phases: editing and evaluation phases. In editing 
phases, people organize and reformulate options and outcomes to simplify their choices. 
There are several operations in the editing phase. The first one is coding. This operation 
codes options and/or problem as losses or gains with respect to the reference point. 
Another one is segregation which distinguishes sure loss and gains from probable ones. 
It defines risky and riskless components as well if there are any. Cancellation is also an 
operation that cancels out same outcomes and probabilities. There is also the 
simplification operation that rounds up probabilities and outcomes. The last one is 
detection dominance which highlights dominant alternatives over others (Kahneman, 
2000). After the editing phase, people make the utility calculation with edited properties 
in the evaluation phase. So, all properties of prospect theory operate in the editing phase 
of the decision making process.   
There are many applications of prospect theory in different fields of social 
sciences. One of the most famous applications in the political science literature is the 
incumbent oriented voting hypothesis. People code benefits of moving away from the 
status-quo as gains and the cost of moving away from it as losses. Since losses loom 
larger than gains, moving away from the status-quo is less desirable (Quattrone, 1988). 
In that respect, a challenger whose policies are perceived better may not win an election 
because when voters make a cost benefit analysis, they overweight the costs. This may 
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cause the objectively more beneficial alternative to be seen as less beneficial vis-a- vis 
the incumbent (Levy, 2003). There are different variants of incumbency oriented voting. 
For instance, the challenger has more chance when there is an economic crisis, since 
voters’ benefit from changing the incumbent increases. It may balance the loss aversion 
and increase the chance of the challenger vis-à-vis the incumbent. Thus, people are 
more inclined to choose the risky option which is the challenger whose performance is 
unknown (Kahneman, 1979). Also, prospect theory is applied to explain the asymmetry 
between the effect of economic recession and the effect of economic prosperity on 
voting behavior. Economic recession is evaluated as a loss while economic prosperity is 
evaluated as a gain. Therefore, recession affects voting behavior more than economic 
prosperity (Bloom, 1975). Moreover, using the same logic, negative attitudes towards 
candidates are more effective on voting behavior than positive attitudes towards 
candidates (Kernell, 1977). Prospect theory is also applied to policy reform processes. 
Societies are risk averse about policy reforms since policy reforms are coded as gains 
(Alesina, 2014).  
Manipulation of the reference point is another issue in the literature. Tversky and 
Kahnemann show that when legislation on women’s rights is framed as the elimination 
of discrimination toward women, people support legislation, but if it is framed as the 
improvement of women rights, support for legislation decreases. The former frames the 
initial condition as a loss, so there is discrimination towards women in society. But the 
latter frames the initial condition that the women’s rights have already been guaranteed 
at some level and that legislation will improve them. Therefore, it is a gain. Since losses 
loom larger than gains, people support legislation more when it is framed as elimination 
of discrimination (Kahneman, 2000). Moreover, Nincic argues that when the president 
of the U.S frames an intervention as “protective” he has more electoral and 
congressional support than when he frames it as “promotive” (Nincic, 1997). In that 
case, protective implies loss while promotive implies gain. 
There are applications of prospect theory on international relations as well. 
Jervis suggests that since states that support the status-quo are in a loss frame, they take 
more risk to defend the status-quo than the states that want to change it (Jervis; 1992). 
Also, Stein applies prospect theory to territory disputes between states. He suggests that 
states which lose territory do not update the ex-ante territorial status-quo as a reference 
point. They continue to use it as reference point. But, states that gain this territory 
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update their reference point according to the new territorial status-quo. This causes that 
both states to perceive themselves in a loss frame and both to engage in risk seeking 
behavior (Stein, 1991).  
Conflict Resolution has been another field of study where prospect theory has 
been applied. Concession aversion is one form of loss aversion in which parties 
perceive their concession as losses. On the other hand, concessions of the opposite party 
are perceived as gains. It causes an impasse since losses are more important than gains 
on the negotiation table (Kahneman, 2000).        
1.5 Application: 
To apply prospect theory to the analyses of strategic voting, first of all, the 
reference point which determines the losses and gains from an election should be 
identified. The reference point for the electoral decision is defined in this study as the 
satisfaction level from the status-quo. The reference point of the voter depends on the 
place of incumbent within the preference ranking of the voter. This means that the 
satisfaction level of the voter from the status-quo increases, when the incumbent’s place 
in the voter’s preference ranking increases. In other words, the satisfaction level of the 
voter gets the highest value when her most preferred party or candidate is the incumbent 
and it gets the lowest value when her least preferred party or candidate is the incumbent.  
The second step is applying the editing phase on the analysis of strategic voting. 
The voter compares her satisfaction levels of expected electoral outcomes to the 
reference point to code outcomes of the election as losses or gains. To evaluate strategic 
voting in that manner, we need to include the necessary condition of strategic voting 
into the analysis. When the most preferred party or candidate has little chance to win the 
election, voting for the second most preferred party or candidate who has more chance 
to win the election becomes a viable option for the voter. It is important to note that, if 
the necessary condition of strategic voting does not occur, then strategic voting is not a 
viable option for the voter. Under the necessary condition of strategic voting, the voter 
may waste her vote if she votes for her most preferred party or candidate. This is 
because voting for the most preferred party or candidate under this condition aims to 
increase the winning chance of the most preferred party or candidate, but this outcome 
has little chance of occurring since the most preferred party or candidate has little 
chance to win the election.  
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If voter chooses to vote sincerely when the necessary condition of strategic 
voting occurs, it means that she tries to increase her satisfaction level from the status-
quo before the election by increasing the probability of her most preferred party or 
candidate winning the elections. So, she tries to increase her expected satisfaction level 
after the election, if it is compared with the satisfaction level before the election. It 
implies that the voter’s reason to vote sincerely is to maximize gain from the election 
when she compares the expected election outcome and reference point. On the other 
hand, if she votes for her second most preferred party or candidate, she aims to prevent 
the less preferred party or candidate from winning the election. It means that she tries to 
minimize her satisfaction level loss when she compares her satisfaction level before the 
election and expected satisfaction level after the election.  
As the third step, loss aversion is incorporated into the analysis. Since, loss 
looms larger than gain, the voter prioritizes to minimize her loss from the election than 
maximize her gain from it. So, she chooses to vote strategically to minimize her loss 
from the election or voting sincerely to maximize her gain.          
The fourth step of the analysis is to detect how the variation of the reference 
point changes the voter’s probability of voting strategically. To explain the argument, 
let’s compare the voter’s decision when her most preferred party or candidate is the 
incumbent and her decision when her less preferred party or candidate is the incumbent. 
If her most preferred party is the incumbent, then her satisfaction level from the status-
quo attains the highest value. In that case, her possible satisfaction level gain from the 
election stays at the minimum, but her possible satisfaction level loss reaches the 
maximum. On the other hand, if her less preferred party or candidate is the incumbent, 
her satisfaction level from the status-quo is at the lowest value. So, her possible 
satisfaction level loss from the election is at a minimum and her possible satisfaction 
level gain from the election is at a maximum. As it was discussed, strategic voting aims 
to minimize the loss with decreasing the chance of the less preferred party or candidate 
to win the election. Therefore, if the voter’s less preferred party or candidate is the 
incumbent, she has less to lose from the election with regard to the reference point. 
Because of this, she is less prone to vote strategically than the voter whose most 
preferred party or candidate is the incumbent. So, a higher satisfaction level increases 
the amount of probable losses from the election and decreases the amount of possible 
gains from it. This means that as the option that aims at decreasing the amount of loss, 
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strategic voting becomes the more viable option, when satisfaction level of the voter 
from the status-quo increases.   
1.6  Model: 
To depict the application of prospect theory on strategic voting more discretely, I 
try to model the strategic voting by including a reference point and voter’s satisfaction 
level into the calculation. Before the formulation of the Model, an important point needs 
to be taken into perspective. This model is not able to explain voting turnout or protest 
vote of the voter. So, there is an assumption that the individual voter votes either 
sincerely or strategically.   
This model is based on the assumption that there are three candidates who 
contest in the election. Candidate i is the most preferred candidate of the voter and the 
voter’s preference towards her is 𝑥𝑖 . Candidate s is the second most preferred candidate 
of the voter and the voter’s preference towards her is 𝑥𝑠 . The third and the least 
preferred candidate of the voter is t and the preference of the voter towards her is 𝑥𝑡 . So, 
the preference order of the voter is: 
𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑠 > 𝑥𝑡    
(1.1) 
The winner is determined by plurality rule which means that the candidate who 
gets the plurality of the votes in the first round will win the election. So, there is no 
second round. This model is applicable not only to the presidential election where 
candidates compete with each other, but also to parliamentary elections where parties 
compete with each other in districts in which the magnitude is one. If district magnitude 
is one, it means that there is only one seat to allocate in each district. Thus, in each 
single district, the election operates as if it were a presidential election. Also, this is 
applicable to local level executive elections. So, it is possible to use the party rather than 
the candidate when the actors that participate in the elections are named. I will name 
those actors as candidates for the sake of simplicity, but they can be named as parties as 
well.        
As in the original model form of prospect theory, this model contains two 
functions: Probability function𝜋(𝑥) and value function𝑉(𝑥). To calculate the utility 
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function of the individual voter from the election with regard to the candidate that she 
votes and the status-quo, these two functions are multiplied with each other.  
𝑈 = 𝜋 𝑥 .𝑉(𝑥) 
(1.2) 
The first part of the utility function 𝜋 𝑥  represents winning probabilities of the 
candidates.  Candidate ἰ as the most preferred candidate is the one who is less expected 
to win the election, while Candidate s has more chance to win the elections. Candidate t 
is the one who is most likely to win elections. These conditions are denoted with 
expected vote shares: 
𝜋 ἰ < 𝜋 𝑠 < 𝜋 𝑡  
(1.3) 
The combination of preferences and probabilities constructs the necessary 
conditions of strategic voting as it was discussed in previous parts. Candidate ἰ as the 
most preferred candidate is the one who is less expected to win elections, while 
Candidate s has more chance to win the election. Candidate t is the one who is most 
likely to win the election.  
The second part of the utility functions is the value function. The value function 
reflects the possible improvement in satisfaction level with regard to the election result. 
I use modified logistic function as the value function: 
𝑉 𝑥 =
1
1+. 𝑒−𝑣 𝑥 
 
(1.4) 
The reason behind the usage of logistic functions as the value functions is that 
logistic function has the same shape as the original value function of prospect theory 
with two exceptions. Firstly, values of logistic function are between 0 and 1. In original 
prospect theory, there is no such restriction on values. Secondly, unlike the value 
function of the prospect theory, the slope of the graph for both negative and positive 
values of x, in this case v(x), are the same. The first property of the function does not 
cause a problem, but the second one contradicts with prospect theory. But, as I will 
discuss in the next paragraph, preference towards the status-quo as the parameter of 
interest will handle this problem and make the logistic function compatible with 
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prospect theory. Below, you can find the hypothetical graph of the value function of the 
original prospect theory and the graph of the original logistic function. 
                                                                                                                                     
                                             
Figure 1.6.1 Graph of Prospect Theory
3
 
                                                        
     Figure 1.6.2 Logistic Function 
 
The voting function of the model  𝑣 𝑥  represents the utility of voting for a 
particular candidate. It is different from the value function since value function shaped 
according to reference point. It also represents the x axis of the graph of the value 
function:   
𝑣 𝑥 = (𝑥𝑣 − 𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞) 
(1.5) 
                                                 
3
 Kahnemann, 1981 
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𝑥𝑣 is the preference towards the candidate who voter is planning to vote for. It 
can obtain two values: 𝑥𝑖  is the value of the voter’s preference for the most preferred 
candidate and 𝑥𝑠 is the value of voter’s preference towards her second most preferred 
candidate, where 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑠 . Also, (𝑥𝑣 − 𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞)  is the difference between the voter’s 
preference for the candidate that she votes for and her preference towards the incumbent 
candidate which is represented by 𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞 . It can obtain values such as 𝑥𝑣. It represents the 
improvement in amount of the satisfaction level with regard to the vote cast in the 
election. Therefore, the voting function has a higher value for the voters whose 
preference towards the incumbent candidate is lower. Furthermore, δ represents the 
factor that decreases the value of preference for the incumbent vis a vis preference 
towards the voted candidate.   
To apply reference point on the value function, the logistic function needs to be 
modified. The reference point represents, as explained before, the satisfaction level 
regarding the difference between the preference towards the incumbent and the 
preference towards the most preferred candidate. In formal terms, it is equal to(𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞 −
𝑥𝑖). So, the point that v(x) =0, is the inclination point where the voter casts a vote for 
the incumbent candidate, should represent the reference point. It is important because, it 
codes losses and gains. To equal the reference point of the function to the satisfaction 
level of the voter, a coefficient (β) is added to the Model.  So, value function represents 
satisfaction level of the voter if: 
1 +  𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞 − 𝑥𝑖 =
1
1 + 𝛽𝑒
 
(1.6) 
When the equation is solved; 
𝛽 =
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞)
(1 +  𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞 − 𝑥𝑖 ). e
 
(1.7) 
The satisfaction level of the voter is added to 1 because; it is originally lower 
than zero. Since the logistic function takes values between 0 and 1, it should be 
modified to make it positive. Adding 1 to satisfaction level normalizes the value of the 
satisfaction level as the reference point of the voter and makes it an inclination point for 
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the value function. So, this equation calculates the value of β which equates the value 
function to the satisfaction level of the voter when the voting function- x axis of graph- 
is equal to zero. In that way, β ensures that the satisfaction level of the voter is the 
reference point of the graph.  
The main aim of the model is to understand the effect of the satisfaction level of 
the voter on the voter’s likelihood of voting strategically. So, the question is when does 
the voter choose to vote strategically rather than vote sincerely according to the model? 
To reveal this, one may compare the utility of strategic voting and the utility of sincere 
voting for the individual voter. If the former is higher than the latter, then one may 
expect that the voter uses her vote strategically in the election. 
  So, it means that: 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 > 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒, 
𝜋 𝑠  .
1
1 + 𝛽𝑒− 𝑥𝑠−𝛿𝑥 𝑠𝑞  
 > 𝜋(𝑖) .
1
1 + 𝛽𝑒− 𝑥𝑖−𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞  
 
(1.8) 
The solution for the equation implies that the voter casts a strategic vote when; 
 𝜋 𝑠 − 𝜋 ἰ  .
𝛽
> 𝑒𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞 . (𝜋 𝑖 . 𝑒−𝑥𝑠 −  𝜋 𝑠 . 𝑒−𝑥𝑖) 
(1.9) 
If β is written in terms of the satisfaction level of the voter: 
 𝜋 𝑠 − 𝜋 ἰ  . (1 +  𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞 − 𝑥𝑖 ). e
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞)
> 𝑒𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞 . (𝜋 𝑖 . 𝑒−𝑥𝑠 −  𝜋 𝑠 . 𝑒−𝑥𝑖) 
(1.10) 
This calculation depends on two related operations. The voter should decide 
which behavior is dominant. This depends on the evaluation of probabilities and 
preferences. If right side of the equation is negative, then sincere voting is the dominant 
option. Since the left side of the equation is negative due to   𝜋 𝑠 − 𝜋 ἰ   being 
negative. The utility of sincere voting is greater than the utility of strategic vote. In this 
case, the expected satisfaction level improvement of the voter does not change the 
equation. However, if the left side of the equation is positive, then strategic voting may 
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have a higher utility than sincere voting. This depends on whether the expected vote 
share of the second most preferred candidate is higher than the expected vote share of 
the most preferred candidate which is a part of the necessary condition, and preferences 
towards these parties. Also, in this case, the satisfaction level from status-quo 𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑞 −
𝑥𝑖  increases the probability of strategic voting as the equation indicates.  
 As model the indicates, when the satisfaction level of voter with regards to her 
preference difference between the incumbent and the most preferred candidate 
increases; the reference point of the voter increases. This means that the value of the 
possible gain from elections decreases while the possible value of loss from election 
increases because; more values are below the reference point. Sincere voting increases 
the probability of gain while strategic voting decreases the probability of loss and since 
loss looms larger than gains, the probability of voting strategically is higher for the 
voters who have a higher satisfaction level. Therefore, the first hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 1: When the satisfaction level of the voter from the status-quo 
increases, the probability of the voter to vote strategically increases as well.  
Let’s compare the conditions where the least preferred candidate of the voter and 
the most preferred candidate of the voter is the incumbent. When necessary condition of 
strategic voting occurs, strategic voting is the dominant option for both of them. But, in 
the case that the least preferred candidate is the incumbent, the voter has a lower 
reference point. Both utility of strategic and sincere voting are almost on the positive 
side of the graph and so are in the gain frame. But, if her most preferred candidate is the 
incumbent, she has a higher reference point. The utility of strategic voting corresponds 
to the negative side of the graph, so it is in the loss frame and sincere voting nearly 
corresponds to the reference point. Due to loss aversion which is represented by steeper 
slope of negative side, voters whose most preferred candidate is the incumbent perceive 
the utility difference between strategic and sincere voting more than voters whose least 
preferred candidate is the incumbent. So, the following second hypothesis is a specific 
application of hypothesis 1: 
 Hypothesis 2: Voters, whose most preferred candidate is the incumbent, are 
more prone to vote strategically than voters whose least preferred candidate is the 
incumbent. 
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It is also possible to derive the hypothesis about the effect of the expected vote 
share margin between the voter’s second most preferred candidate and the voter’s most 
preferred candidate on the probability of the voter casting a strategic vote:  
    Hypothesis 3: As the vote share gap between the voter’s second most 
preferred candidate/party and the voter’s most preferred candidate/party increases, the 
probability of the voter to vote strategically increases as well.   
The last hypothesis is about whether an increase in the expected vote shares 
difference alters the effect of the satisfaction level of the voter or not:  
Hypothesis 4: When the vote share gap between the voter’s second most 
preferred candidate and the voter’s most preferred candidate decreases, the effect of the 
satisfaction level on the strategic voting decision increases.  
In the next chapter, hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 will be tested with an experimental 
study. Then, these hypotheses will be tested with data from the British Electoral Studies 
data set for 2010 and 2015 elections.    
25 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2:  
The Experiment 
This chapter is reserved for the analysis of hypotheses with an experimental 
study. There will be two independent analyses of experimental data to test various 
hypotheses. Firstly, there will be regression analyses to test individual level hypotheses. 
Then, Kruskal-Wallis H tests will be conducted to test modified aggregate level 
hypotheses. Before these statistical tests, I will explain why the experiment is an 
appropriate method for this study. After that, there will be explanation of the 
experiment, the experimental settings and procedures.    
2.1 Why Experiment? 
There are advantages and disadvantages to using experiment as a method for this 
study. First of all, as discussed previously people may vote strategically when the 
necessary condition occurs in the electoral context. The second preferred candidate 
should have higher chance of winning the election than the most preferred candidate 
and there should be at least one more candidate that has a higher expected vote share 
than the most preferred candidate. It is sometimes hard to find such instances 
representatively in actual data. Nevertheless, experiments give leverage to construct the 
necessary condition by experimental settings. Also, in actual settings, it is hard to find 
enough cases including conditions that increase the voter’s probability of voting 
strategically such as electoral rule, distance of parties or candidates or as the main 
research interest of this study; satisfaction level from status-quo.. Experiments enable us 
to construct and manipulate these conditions as well. Also, randomization as one of the 
main virtues of the experimental design, gives leverage for the causal inference. Of 
course, there are also disadvantages using an experimental method to study on strategic 
voting. The most important problem is that experiment cannot sufficiently reflect the 
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actual party preferences of the subjects. In this study, there is a hypothetical election 
and presidential candidates. Furthermore, preferences for these candidates are given to 
the subject. This may not be sufficient to measure the effect of the preferences on 
strategic voting since; people may not feel the same level of affiliation to hypothetical 
candidates and actual candidates. Actually, in the pre-test questionnaire, there is a 
question which measures the subject’s strength of actual party affiliation. It might be the 
case that people transpose strength of their party affiliation to the hypothetical 
candidates.  
2.2 Why Presidential Elections? 
The presidential election context is chosen as it offers one of the most 
appropriate settings for the strategic voting. Presidential elections are zero-sum games 
in which there is only one winner. In presidential elections, district magnitude is one 
while the only district is the whole country. There is only one seat to allocate and 
candidates who finish the election in position other than the first place win nothing from 
the election. It means that a vote for a candidate who has little chance of winning the 
election implies wasting the vote as is indicated by the Law of Duverger. So, electorates 
who intend to vote for candidates who have little chance of winning election have little 
chance to be represented. This increases the voter’s likelihood of voting strategically. 
When voters perceive that the candidate who they prefer the most, cannot win the 
election, since voting for this candidate gives them nothing with regard to their policy 
position and cannot change the absolute winner, they may prefer the candidate who has 
a chance to win the election and the more preferable among other candidates who has 
chance of winning the election. 
2.3 Experimental Settings: 
In the experiment, subjects are asked how they might vote in a hypothetical 
presidential election. There are three candidates who are participating in the 
hypothetical elections. For subjects, the preference rankings about the three presidential 
candidates are given in the text. Candidate Fatih Evren is the most preferred candidate 
where candidate Ali Yılmaz is the second most preferred one. The other candidate İrfan 
Gürkaynak is the least preferred one among them. There are also results of three 
different polls in which the predicted vote shares of the candidates before the election 
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are shown. The vote share differences of candidates are approximately same in the three 
polls.  
The experimental setting tries to ensure the necessary condition for strategic 
voting. The necessary conditions for strategic voting are set in the experiment as 
follows: Fatih Evren as the most preferred candidate is displayed in third place where 
Ali Yılmaz as the second preferred candidate is shown in second place by three 
different polls which are given in the experiment. Also, polls show that the least 
preferred candidate İrfan Gürkaynak is expected to finish the election in first place. 
Thus, Fatih Evren as a candidate who enjoys sincere votes is the one who has the least 
chance of winning the election. On the other hand, Ali Yılmaz as the second most 
preferred candidate enjoys strategic voting since; Fatih Evren has little chance of 
winning the presidential election.  
The expected vote share difference between candidates in first and second place 
is fixed approximately at 1%. It increases subjects’ perception of being pivotal in the 
elections if they vote strategically. It is possible to add this difference as a variable 
rather than a constant into the experiment. However, turning it to a variable increases 
the number of groups which means that there should be more subjects to make causal 
inference. Because of the limitations of finding more subjects, the difference between 
the first and the second candidate is given as a constant.      
After reading the given information, subjects are asked to choose one of the 
options that indicate their possible voting behavior in hypothetical elections. There are 
seven options for the subjects to show their voting inclinations. They can vote for one of 
the three candidates, they can abstain or they can select the option that they are 
undecided. Voting for Fatih Evren and Ali Yılmaz represented with four options to 
detect the variance in the subject’s choice: I certainly vote for Fatih Evren, I probably 
vote for Fatih Evren, I certainly vote for Ali Yılmaz or I probably vote for Ali Yılmaz. 
  Four groups are constructed to detect the effect of two independent variables on 
the dependent variable. The first independent variable is the satisfaction level. In group 
1 and group 3, Fatih Evren, the most preferred candidate, is the incumbent president 
before the elections while in group 2 and group 4, İrfan Gürkaynak, as the least 
preferred candidate, is the incumbent president. As the manipulation, the incumbency is 
highlighted in four different sections of the text. First, when candidates are introduced, 
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the current president is designated explicitly. Second, when candidates’ policy 
proximities are defined, again the current president is highlighted. Thirdly, when three 
different polls are introduced, the current president is written with adjective of 
“President”. Finally, options to vote for the current president have same adjective as 
well. By this way, the experiment tries to reveal changing in subject’s inclination to 
vote for her second most preferred candidate with regard to whether incumbent is her 
most preferred candidate or her least preferred candidate. 
 Voting for Ali Yılmaz, as the second most preferred candidate, implies voting 
strategically, so that experiment compares tendency of subjects to vote for Ali Yılmaz 
who encounter Fatih Evren as president and participants who encounter Fatih Evren as 
the opposition candidate.   
The second independent variable is the difference of shown vote shares between 
Ali Yılmaz and Fatih Evren. This variable tries to reveal the effect of the expected vote 
share the difference between the most preferred candidate and the second most preferred 
candidate on voter’s probability of voting strategically. In the first and second groups, 
difference between the vote shares of Ali Yılmaz and Fatih Evren is approximately 
7,5% ,on the average for three polls, while in the third and the fourth groups, it is 
approximately 22,5% on the average for three polls. By this way, the experiment may 
be able to show whether voter’s sincere candidate’s distance from contestation affects 
her probability of voting strategically or not.  
The table below shows how independent variables changes in different groups. 
In the first group, the most preferred candidate is the incumbent and the gap between 
him and the second most preferred candidate is low. In the second group, difference 
between the most preferred candidate and the second most preferred candidate is low 
again, but in this group the most preferred candidate is not the incumbent. In the third 
and fourth groups, the gap between the two candidates is high, but in the third group, 
the most preferred candidate is the incumbent while in the fourth group the least 
preferred candidate is the incumbent.   
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Table 2.3.1: Groups 
 
Incumbency of the most preferred candidate 
  
Incumbent 
 
Not Incumbent 
 
The gap between 
the most and the 
second-most 
preferred candidate 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Group 1 
 
 
Group 2 
 
 
High 
 
 
Group 3 
 
 
Group 4 
         
2.4 Dependent Variable:   
Before passing on to the statistical analysis, two different coding schemes of the 
dependent variable which were used for both statistical analyses will be briefly 
discussed. As the first coding scheme, voter’s likelihood of voting strategically as the 
dependent variable is coded with regard to responses of the subjects as follows: Firstly, 
if the subjects choose the option “I may abstain” or if they choose “I may vote for İrfan 
Gürkaynak”, they are excluded from the analysis. If the subjects’ response to 
experimental question is other than “I may abstain” or “I may vote for İrfan 
Gürkaynak”, then: If subjects choose “I would certainly vote for Fatih Evren”, it is 
coded as “1”, if they choose “I would probably vote for Fatih Evren”, it is coded as “2”. 
If the subjects’ response is “I would be undecided”, it is coded as “3”. “I would 
probably vote for Ali Yılmaz” is coded as “4” while “I would certainly vote for Ali 
Yılmaz” is coded as “5”. So, this variable is designed to increase when the subjects’ 
inclination to vote strategically increase. 
The second coding scheme is to construct a binary dependent variable. It is 
coded for subjects who choose “I would certainly vote for Fatih Evren” and “I would 
probably vote for Fatih Evren” as “0” and for subjects who choose “I would probably 
vote for Ali Yılmaz” as “1”.  
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2.5 The pre-test survey: 
Before the experiment, subjects answered a pre-test questionnaire. It contains 
demographic questions such as age, gender, education level etc…. Also, there are three 
questions to measure their actual voting choices. One question asks whether they voted 
in the previous elections or not while the other one asks whether they plan to vote in 
next elections or not. The third question attempts to measure the strength of party 
affiliation on a four point Likert-scale. Lastly, in the pre-test survey, there is a question 
to measure the risk attitude of the subject. They are asked to choose between two 
discount options: they can choose a definite 10% discount on the ticket price or they can 
choose to flip a coin; if it is head, they will get 20% discount on the ticket price, but if it 
is tail, they get no discount. As it can be observed both options has some expected 
utility, but if the voter chooses second option, it implies that she is a risk-seeker, while 
if she choose the first option she is risk-averse. It is important to note that subjects are in 
gain frame according to the prospect theory. It implies that they are expected to be more 
risk averse. So, even under this condition, if a voter chooses the risky option, it means 
that she has a strong tendency for the risk-seeking behavior. 
2.6 The Pilot: 
 Before the experiment, it is important to test whether intended manipulation in 
the experiment will be successful or not. To learn this, there should be a pilot study in 
which the manipulation check is done. Manipulation in this experiment is changing the 
incumbency in between the most preferred candidate and the least preferred candidate 
across different groups. In the first and the third groups, it is given that the most 
preferred candidate is the incumbent while in the second and the fourth groups, it is 
given that the least preferred candidate is the incumbent. To ensure the construct 
validity of the experiment, it is important to be sure that voters pay attention to who the 
incumbent is. The information pertaining to the the incumbency position of a candidate 
constitutes the necessary condition of this study. If they are not aware of who the 
incumbent is, the experimental question cannot measure the effect of incumbency on 
strategic voting. One of the possible ways to understand this is to generate a 
contradiction about incumbency. As it was indicated, subjects are informed four times 
within the text about who the incumbent is. In the pilot study, subjects read a text which 
informs them that İrfan Gürkaynak is the current president, but in the part which 
includes options that ask them to vote for a candidate, Fatih Evren is defined as the 
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current president. So, there is a contradiction introduced into the text of the 
questionnaire. First, subjects are asked to answer the experimental question that has the 
contradictory information regarding the incumbency embedd into it. After collecting the 
experiment sheets, they are asked to write down whether they noticed any contradiction 
in the text on a piece of paper. This procedure was applied to 19 students at Yıldırım 
Beyazıt University. 14 out of 19 students noticed the contradiction in the text correctly. 
Actually, some of them asked me about the contradiction as they were responding to the 
questionnaire. Therefore, it might be possible to say that most of the subjects were 
aware of who the incumbent is. In fact, there might be another way, which maybe more 
accurate, to check the manipulation. Subjects may be asked to write down who the 
incumbent is after experimental sheets are collected. In that way, for all subjects, I may 
be sure whether they are aware of whom the incumbent is or not. However, in most of 
the experiments, I did not conduct them myself; therefore, I do not want to complicate 
the experimental procedure. Certain concerns about the implementation of experimental 
procedure may arise. However, it was not possible to conduct experiments for farmer 
subjects.  Also, subjects may realize the incumbent just after it is asked even though 
they cannot see the text after the experiment. So, the correct answer may not necessarily 
show that they noticed who the president is when they answered the question. In fact the 
best way may be to triangulate these pilots. But still, it can be claimed that the most of 
the subjects noticed who the president is.               
2.7 Experimental Procedure: 
Experiments are conducted in eight different institutions. Four of them are 
universities.  140 subjects are students of Ankara, Kırıkkale, Elazığ and Bingöl 
Universities. The remaining 158 subjects are the farmer members of the Turkey Cattle 
Breeders’ Association in four different cities; Ankara, İstanbul, Aydın and Mersin. 
Actually, experiments are conducted in Harran University, Kars, Tekirdağ and Erzincan 
Cattle Breeders’ Associations as well. However, data from these institutions are 
excluded from the analysis basically for the two main reasons. First, some of the 
subjects who participate in the experiments from some of the Turkey Cattle Breeders’ 
City Association are not farmers; they are the administrative staff of the associations. 
Second, hand-writing on experimental sheets and answers for questions undeniably 
resemble each other and therefore, they are excluded from the analysis. 
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It gives us an important leverage to use both students and farmers as subjects in 
the experiment. Since Sears’ article on problems of using only students in social 
psychology experiments, causing researchers to cast doubt on causal inference with 
experimental data gathered only from student subjects. It is argued that this damages the 
external validity of the research since generalizing results for the whole population with 
only data from a particular group may break causal inference (Sears, 1986). To deal 
with this problem, scholars who use only students as subjects in experiment widely refer 
conservative bias to increase the external validity of their research. It suggests that 
particular attributes of students may make it harder to find relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. For example, students are less susceptible to 
group norms than the population (Sears, 1986). So, an experiment which tries to 
identify a relationship between a group norm and type of behavior with student subjects 
benefits from the conservative bias. If the researcher can identify a relationship between 
a group norm and a behavior with student subjects, she can generalize her result since; 
if it is valid for a group that it is less susceptible to group norms, it is also valid for the 
population whose average of susceptibility is higher than students. In recent years, some 
scholars stand against the criticism regarding using only student subjects in 
experiments. For example, Druckman and Kam suggest that if there is not a factor or 
feature that significantly differentiates students from the population with regard to the 
research interest, results from experiments with student subjects can be generalized. 
According to them, the best way to handle this problem is to compare the student group 
with a non-student group (Druckman, 2011). In this study, the comparison of the results 
for farmers and students may reveal different effects of treatments on different groups. 
Also, control variables may enable us to identify which attribute of a particular group 
might alter the effects of independent variables. In this way, it may increase the external 
validity of the experiment and makes it possible to generalize the result from the 
students to the population.         
Students participated to the experiment in classroom settings. Experiments were 
distributed in the last 15 minutes of a class hour. They were not offered any material 
benefits for participating in the experiment. They were randomly assigned to particular 
groups. On the other hand, farmers participated in the experiment during weekly visit by 
staff of the city association in villages. They were also not offered any material benefits. 
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Subjects signed informant consent first, and then answered the pre-test questions. After 
these, they answered the experimental question.  
 In fact, experiments for students are more like a laboratory experiment while 
experiments for farmers are more like a survey experiment. In laboratory experiments, 
researchers can control and create the settings of the experiment. In survey experiments, 
researchers intervene with the survey questions and the survey can be conducted via 
phone, online or in-person. These are ideal types; experiments might combine features 
of different types (Druckman, 2011). Experiments in this study combine features of 
different type.  
2.8 Descriptive Statistics: 
To present the row data, there are two tables which show the number of options 
that are chosen by the subjects in each groups and the mean value of the continuous 
dependent variable for each group. Mean values are calculated by excluding subjects 
that choose the options “I may abstain” or “I may vote for İrfan Gürkaynak”.  In both 
analyses, these subjects were excluded. So, 32 data from the experiment are missing. In 
the tables, “experiment” column refers to four experimental groups.           
Table 2.8.1: Descriptive Statistics 1  
                     
     Total          22         10         74         70         49         55         21         301 
                                                                                                    
         4           4          4         18         16         16         11          4          73 
         3           5          0         13         17         12         15          8          70 
         2           8          5         27         23          5         10          3          81 
         1           5          1         16         14         16         19          6          77 
                                                                                                    
Experiment          -2         -1          1          2          3          4          5       Total
                                                 Vote
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   Table 2.8.2: Descriptive Statistics 2 
  
          
    
2.9 Regression Analysis: 
 For the individual level analysis, OLS regressions were conducted. Three 
hypotheses which are derived from the model will be tested: 
 Hypothesis 1: Voters, whose most preferred candidate is the incumbent, are 
more prone to vote strategically than voters whose least preferred candidate is the 
incumbent. 
Hypothesis 2: As the vote share gap between the most preferred candidate and 
the second most preferred candidate increases, voter’s probability of voting 
strategically increases as well. 
Hypothesis 3: When the vote share gap between the second most preferred and 
the most preferred candidate decreases, the effect of satisfaction level on strategic 
voting decisions increases.  
To do the regression analysis, subjects whose most preferred candidate is the 
incumbent president are coded as ”1” while subjects whose least preferred candidate is 
the incumbent are coded as “0”. So, variable “incumbent” is one if the subject is 
assigned to the first or the third groups and it is zero when s/he is assigned to one of the 
second or the fourth groups. Another variable “margin” is created to analyze the effect 
of the margin between the second most preferred and the most preferred candidates. If 
the assigned margin is high (22.5), it is coded as one and if it is low (7.5), it is coded as 
                      
     Total    2.099668
                      
         4    2.054795
         3    2.471429
         2    1.506173
         1    2.428571
                      
experiment        mean
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zero. The former corresponds to the subjects in the third and the fourth groups while the 
latter corresponds to subjects in the first and the second groups. 
Also, variable profession is coded as one for farmers and it is coded as zero for 
students. Party affiliation measures the strength of the subjects’ real life affiliation to 
their most preferred party. It is coded as one, for the option that indicates the lowest 
affiliation, and it is coded as four for the option that indicates the highest affiliation. 
Variable risk is coded as zero for the risk averse subjects while it is coded as one for the 
risk seekers.      
The regression tables below show statistical analyses. The first table shows the 
regression analysis for both students and farmers. The analysis reflects that when the 
subject’s most preferred candidate is the incumbent, the voter’s likelihood to cast a 
strategic vote increases with p<0.01 significance level. This implies that voters, whose 
most preferred candidate is the incumbent, are more inclined to vote strategically. Also, 
variable profession negatively correlates with the likelihood of strategic voting. It 
means that students have a higher inclination to vote strategically than farmers. It has a 
significance level of p<0.05. The last variable margin shows whether subjects encounter 
high difference between the most preferred and the second most preferred candidate or 
not does not significantly affect the dependent variable. 
The second regression table shows the separate analyses for students and 
farmers. As it can be observed, the incumbency of the most preferred candidate 
increases the likelihood of a casting strategic vote for both groups. But, it has a higher 
significance level for students (p<0.01) than farmers (p<0.05). Moreover, the results for 
expected vote share margin between the most preferred candidate and the second most 
preferred candidate are significant for farmers at p<0.1 significance level, but are not 
significant for the student participants. Results also show that control variables; level of 
real life party affiliation and risk attitude; do not significantly affect the probability of 
strategic voting. For farmers, there are two more control variables which are education 
and age. Only education significantly affects the likelihood of strategic voting. The 
education level of farmers increases their tendency to vote strategically.   
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    Table 2.9.1: Regression Results: Overall  
 
 
              Table 2.9.2: Regression Results by Profession 
 
 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                    
Number of cases               269             269   
R-squared                  0.0449          0.0616   
                                                    
                          (16.38)         (15.20)   
Constant                    2.192***        2.369***
                                          (-2.18)   
Prof                                       -0.326** 
                           (1.33)          (1.26)   
margin                      0.206           0.195   
                           (3.29)          (3.21)   
incumbent                   0.510***        0.495***
                                                    
                              b/t             b/t   
                               M1              M2   
                                                    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                    
Number of cases               136             130   
R-squared                  0.0620          0.0991   
                                                    
                           (8.90)          (2.10)   
Constant                    2.612***        1.437** 
                                           (2.29)   
Education                                   0.226** 
                                           (0.38)   
Age                                       0.00419   
                          (-0.77)         (-0.00)   
Risk                       -0.201        -0.00107   
                          (-0.57)         (-1.01)   
PartyA                    -0.0666          -0.121   
                          (-0.14)          (1.70)   
margin                    -0.0306           0.381*  
                           (2.65)          (1.99)   
incumbent                   0.584***        0.451** 
                                                    
                              b/t             b/t   
                          Student          Farmer   
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Also, it is possible to analyze similarly with the binary dependent variable which 
is coded for subjects who choose “I would certainly vote for Fatih Evren” and “I would 
probably vote for Fatih Evren” as 0 and for subjects who choose “I would probably vote 
for Ali Yılmaz” as 1 respectively.  
Below you can find the results of the logistic regression. As it can be observed 
results for effect of incumbency are the same except for the farmers. But, it is still 
nearly significant at p< 0.10 level with p value= 0.101 
       
Table 2.9.3: Logistic Regression 1 
         * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                    
Number of cases               220             220             220   
R-squared                                                           
                                                                    
                          (-5.03)         (-4.62)         (-3.02)   
Constant                   -1.099***       -1.182***       -0.880***
                                                          (-2.05)   
Prof                                                       -0.597** 
                                           (0.64)          (0.55)   
margin                                      0.185           0.160   
                           (3.00)          (2.97)          (2.93)   
incumbent                   0.875***        0.867***        0.866***
vote1                                                               
                                                                    
                              b/t             b/t             b/t   
                               M1              M2              M3   
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Table 2.9.4: Logistic Regression 2 
           
The last question of this section is on how the effect of the incumbency on 
strategic voting changes for subjects that encounter low or high margins. It points out 
the third hypothesis of this study in which the effect of difference between vote share of 
the second most preferred candidate and the most preferred candidate alters the effect of 
incumbency on strategic voting. Below, you can find the results of the OLS regression. 
Results suggest that when the margin is low, whether the incumbent candidate is the 
most preferred one or the least preferred one alters the voter’s likelihood of voting 
strategically significantly. However, when this margin is high, this relationship 
disappears. Thus, this findings support the third hypothesis of this study. Furthermore, 
profession of the subject does not affect the dependent variable significantly. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                    
Number of cases               109             110   
R-squared                                           
                                                    
                          (-0.72)         (-2.12)   
Constant                   -0.389          -3.349** 
                                           (2.56)   
Education                                   0.550** 
                                           (0.40)   
Age                                       0.00951   
                          (-0.63)         (-0.39)   
PartyA                     -0.142         -0.0917   
                          (-1.08)         (-0.15)   
Risk                       -0.528          -0.103   
                          (-0.41)          (1.17)   
margin                     -0.164           0.536   
                           (2.34)          (1.64)   
incumbent                   0.975**         0.769   
vote1                                               
                                                    
                              b/t             b/t   
                          Student          Farmer   
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Table 2.9.5: High vs. Low Margin 
 
2.10 Comparison of the groups: 
There is another statistical way to detect the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. Comparison of the mean and the median of the dependent 
variable for experimental groups may reveal the treatment effect of experiment. 
However, causal inference made from the comparison of groups cannot be applied to 
individual voters. Because, the means and the median are aggregate level data, so 
making inferences about individuals causes the ecological fallacy problem. 
Nevertheless, these comparisons enable us to analyze how vote shares of candidates 
may change with regard to their status as the incumbent or the opposition. So in this 
part, causal inferences will be done taking into account the vote shares of different 
candidates. This gives leverage when coming to conclusions about not only the effect of 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                                    
Number of cases               139             139             130             129   
R-squared                  0.0703           0.141          0.0157          0.0796   
                                                                                    
                          (13.81)          (2.52)         (15.61)          (1.62)   
Constant                    2.103***        1.887**         2.492***        1.514   
                                          (-0.89)                          (0.80)   
Prof                                       -0.283                           0.293   
                                           (1.33)                          (2.14)   
Education                                   0.162                           0.342** 
                                          (-0.15)                          (0.08)   
Age                                      -0.00186                         0.00134   
                                           (0.45)                         (-1.53)   
Risk                                        0.126                          -0.455   
                                          (-0.70)                         (-0.98)   
PartyA                                    -0.0787                          -0.118   
                           (3.22)          (3.45)          (1.43)          (1.02)   
incumbent                   0.686***        0.738***        0.323           0.237   
                                                                                    
                              b/t             b/t             b/t             b/t   
                             Low1            Low2           High1           High2   
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incumbency on individual voters as the previous part implies, but also the effect of 
incumbency on the number of strategic votes that candidates lose.  
Conventionally, ANOVA is the common method to compare groups. ANOVA 
has an assumption of normal distribution which means that the dependent variable in 
each group approximately has a normal distribution. But, the dependent variable, 
likelihood of strategic voting, for experimental groups in this study is not normally 
distributed. Therefore, to make a more robust test, I use Kruskal-Wallis tests which do 
not require normally distributed dependent variable. The Kruskal-Wallis test ranks 
values of the dependent variables and compares their median rather than their means. In 
this way, it deals with data which are not normally distributed.  
There will be several comparisons between different groups to understand how 
the incumbency of a candidate may affect her probability to loss votes because of 
strategic voting and how the expected vote share margin between the most preferred and 
the second most preferred candidates affects the most preferred candidate’s probability 
of losing votes due to strategic voting.     
To answer the question of how the incumbency of a candidate may affect the 
probability to loss votes because of strategic voting, there will be two comparisons; 
between group 1 and group 2 and group 3 and group 4. In this way, it is possible to 
estimate the aggregate responses of the voters whose most preferred candidate is 
assigned as the incumbent and voters whose least preferred candidate is assigned as the 
opposition by fixing the gap between the most and the second most preferred 
candidates.  
Testing how the expected vote share margin between the most preferred and the 
second most preferred candidates affects the most preferred candidate’s probability of 
losing votes due to strategic voting requires fixing the effect of incumbency and to 
observe variance in the responses of the subjects who encounter different levels of gap. 
Throughout to procedure, there will be comparisons between group 1 and group 3 and 
group 2 and group 4.  
Finally, comparisons of the median difference between group 1 and group 2, and 
group 3 and group 4 may reveal whether the expected vote share difference between the 
most preferred candidate and the second most preferred candidate alters the effect of the 
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most preferred candidate’s incumbency on the probability that he suffers from losing 
support due to strategic voting.    
So, in light of the original hypotheses, there might be three modified hypotheses 
for the aggregate level of analysis: 
Hypothesis 1: The incumbent candidate suffers from losing support because of 
strategic votes more than the candidate that is in opposition. 
Hypothesis 2: When the vote share margin between the most preferred candidate 
and the second most preferred candidate increases, the probability that the most 
preferred candidate suffers from losing support due to strategic voting increases as 
well. 
Hypothesis 3: When the expected vote share margin between the most preferred 
candidate and the second most preferred candidate increases, the effect of incumbency 
the of the most preferred candidate on the probability that he suffers from losing 
support due to strategic voting decreases.    
Comparisons regarding the hypotheses are summarized in the table below. 
  
    Table 2.10.1: Comparisons 
                                                                            
    Comparison 1 Comparison 2 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Group 1 vs. Group 2 
 
Group 3 vs. Group 4 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
Group 1 vs. Group 3 
 
Group 2 vs. Group 4 
  
Hypothesis 3 
 
Group1-Group2 vs. 
Group3-Group4 
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2.11 Results: 
To test the first hypothesis, Two Kruskal Wallis H tests were conducted. The 
first comparison was made between the median values of group 1 and group 2. It 
showed that there is statistically significant difference in the probability of voting 
strategically between two groups (chi-squ= 9.804, p= 0.0017). So, the median of group 
1 is higher than the median of group 2 and this difference is statistically significant. 
Second, the comparison was made between the median values of group 3 and group 4. 
For this comparison, there is not a statistically significant difference in the dependent 
variable between the two groups (chi-squ= 1.877, p= 0.1707). The median of group 3 is 
higher than group 4, but it is not statistically significant. Results of these tests support 
the first hypothesis that the incumbent candidate suffers more from losing support due 
to strategic voting. Even though the median difference between group 3 and group 4 is 
not statistically significant, median of group 3 still higher than the median of group 4. It 
might be argued that when the expected vote share difference between the most 
preferred candidate and the second most preferred candidate is sufficiently high, the 
importance of the satisfaction level decreases for voters and they are more prone to vote 
strategically.     
To test the second hypothesis, two Kruskal Wallis H tests were conducted as 
well. The first comparison was made between the median values of group 1 and group 
3. It showed that there is no statistically significant difference in dependent variable 
between two groups (chi-squ= 0.008, p= 0.9288). A second comparison was made 
between the median values of group 2 and group 4. It showed that there is almost a 
statistically significant difference in the probability of strategic voting between two 
groups at p<0.05 level (chi-squ= 3,760, p= 0.0525). So, the median of group 4 is higher 
than median of group 2 and this difference is statistically significant. Results shows that 
high expected vote share margin between the most preferred candidate and the second 
most preferred candidate increases the most preferred candidate’s probability of losing 
support because of strategic votes. But, when the gap is smaller this treatment effect is 
not be observed.     
For the last hypothesis, there might be comparisons of median differences with 
the results of four Kruskal Wallis H tests. The median difference between group 1 and 
group 2 is higher than the median difference between group 3 and group 4. It implies 
that the incumbency of the most preferred candidate has a stronger effect on the 
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probability that he suffers from losing support due to strategic votes where the vote 
share gap between the most preferred candidate and the second most preferred candidate 
is higher.   
2.12 Discussion: 
Both OLS regressions for the individual level and Kruskal Wallis H tests for the 
aggregate level support the incumbency effect on likelihood of strategic voting. Also, 
results for the individual level and the aggregate level analyses show that an increase in 
expected vote share gap between the most preferred candidate and second most 
preferred candidate decreases the incumbency effect. Furthermore, results for the 
second hypothesis at the aggregate level analysis fit with the expectations as well. 
However, the individual level analysis for the second hypothesis does not fit with 
expectations. Actually, this might be a natural result of the experimental settings. Since 
the margin has two values as zero and one, the real independent effect of the margin on 
strategic voting might not be revealed with this analysis. In a real life setting, the margin 
is a continuous variable which obtains numbers of values. Making it a binary variable as 
low and high may prevent this study from revealing the real effect of the gap between 
the most preferred candidate and the second most preferred candidate on the strategic 
voting behavior of subjects. In the next chapter, an analysis of strategic voting in the 
2010 and the 2015 UK elections will reveal the strong effect of the gap between the 
most preferred candidate and the second most preferred candidate on voter’s likelihood 
of voting strategically.  
On the other hand, result suggests that at both the individual and the aggregate 
levels, the high margin between the second most preferred candidate and the most 
preferred candidate decreases the effect of incumbency on strategic voting. So, if this 
margin is very high, the incumbency effect on strategic voting disappears.  
Another important point to discuss is the comparison of students and farmers in 
the individual level analysis. As the results of our analyses suggest students are more 
prone to vote strategically than farmers under the treatment effect. The incumbency of 
the most preferred candidate increases the voter’s probability of voting strategically for 
both groups, but it has a higher significance level for students. Also, the expected vote 
share margin between the most preferred candidate and the second most preferred 
candidate significantly affects the voter’s probability of voting strategically for farmers, 
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but it is not statistically significant for students. So, it might be said that farmers are 
more sensitive to this margin than students.  
The difference between students and farmers in terms of their probability of 
voting strategically might be result of the levels of their education. As results suggest 
farmers who have higher levels of education are more prone to vote strategically than 
farmers who have lower levels of education. Since one of the characteristic differences 
between farmers and students is their level of education, this might be one of the 
reasons why such a difference in terms of their probability of voting strategically 
emerges.  
Lastly, it is important to note that subjects do not transpose their actual party 
affiliations when they answer experimental question. As it can be observed in next 
chapter, the strength of party affiliation for the most preferred party decreases the 
likelihood of strategic voting and the strength of preference towards the second most 
preferred candidate increases the likelihood of strategic voting.  This might damage 
experimental realism. But still, this problem can be ignored owing to the leverage of 
experimental study to control other parameters that alter strategic voting. In next 
chapter, there will be analysis of how party affiliations for the most preferred party and 
the second most preferred party affect the effect of incumbency on voter’s probability of 
voting strategically.           
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Chapter 3:  
Analysis of UK General Elections: 
In the previous chapter, results of experiments support the hypothesis that voters 
whose most preferred candidate is the incumbent are more prone to vote strategically 
than voters whose most preferred candidate is in the opposition. However, experiment 
as a method has two shortcomings to analyze strategic voting. Since preferences are 
given in experiment, it is not possible to apply satisfaction as a level because, it was 
reduced whether the most preferred party is incumbent or not. Also, it was not possible 
to control the effect of variance in level of preferences on strategic voting. Analysis in 
real settings deals with these shortcomings of experimental study while experimental 
study offers more controlled settings which are not possibly ensured by data analysis. 
Also, randomization is another leverage of the experiment for causal inference 
In this chapter, there will be a data analysis of Wave 4 of The British Election 
Study Internet Panel for detecting strategic voting in the 2010 and the 2015 UK 
Parliamentary elections. It was the latest data set available when I started to study. The 
UK is chosen since; its electoral rule is Single Member District plurality in which the 
Law of Duverger would work. It is because; parties who cannot finish first place in 
constituencies are absolute losers. Only the winner is elected. As it was discussed, it 
increases incentives to vote strategically since; a vote for the party who does not have a 
chance of winning the election in a constituency is a wasted vote. Therefore, voters 
whose most preferred party does not have the chance of winning the election in their 
constituency may cast a strategic vote for the party which has the chance of winning the 
election and prefer this party over other contenders who have a chance of winning the 
election. Also, it is categorized as a “two and a half system” in which there are three 
effective parties, even if the 2015 parliamentary elections, we witnessed the rise of the 
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Scottish National Party and the UK Independence Party. Furthermore, it has a system 
where the incumbent party is likely to end up as the 3
rd
 party at the district level. Thus, 
the United Kingdom is one of the most studied countries in the strategic voting 
literature because of these features.  
Analyzing the 2010 and the 2015 elections enable us to test the hypotheses of 
this study which are derived from the model in the first chapter. The first hypothesis is 
the main hypothesis, namely that when the satisfaction level of the voter from the 
status-quo increases, voter’s likelihood of voting strategically increases as well. The 
second hypothesis is about the voter’s expected vote share difference between the 
second most preferred party and the most preferred party. When, this difference is 
increasing, the voter’s likelihood of voting strategically increases as well. There will be 
various analyses with different independent variables to test these hypotheses. Also, two 
different operationalizations of the dependent variable, one as a binary and the other as 
a continous scale, are used in the statistical analyses below. 
In this chapter, possible strategic voters will be identified with the method which 
is widely used in the strategic voting literature. Then, the operationalization of the 
dependent and independent variables will be presented. After that, the results of the 
regression analyses that test the hypotheses of this study will be presented. The chapter 
will end with a discussion of the results and their implications for further research.        
3.1 Strategic Voters: 
Analyzing the strategic voting as a highly context dependent behavior, is not a 
simple process. Strategic voting is a feasible option just for a subset of voters. To define 
these voters, we need to implement the necessary condition of the strategic voting 
.Possible strategic voter is the one whose most preferred party has less chance of 
winning the election than her second most preferred party and there should be at least 
one more party that has a higher expected vote share than her most preferred party. 
Therefore, to define possible strategic voters we need to define: 
1- Expected or actual rankings of parties in every constituency according to vote 
shares, 
2- The most preferred party of the voter.  
3- The second most preferred party of the voter. 
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Table 3.1.1 represents strategic voters with regards to their type of 
constituencies, their most preferred and their second most preferred party which is 
subjected to strategic voting. For votes that were cast in the 2010 election, parties’ ranks 
are determined by elections results in constituencies. For the 2015 elections, these 
rankings are constructed regarding voter’s expectations on ranking of parties in their 
constituencies. Below, you can find the table that posits possible strategic voters and 
parties that they may vote strategically for.     
Second, the most and the second most preferred parties of the voter should be 
determined. In this analysis, only the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the 
Liberal Democratic Party and their voters are included in the analysis. The most 
preferred party is the one which the voter feels closest to her. The second most preferred 
party is defined as the party that the voter feels closer to than the other party in the 
analysis. For each individual participant, her preference ranking for parties is 
constructed. Regarding their feeling thermometer, there are six possible preference 
ranks. This is shown in Table 3.1.2. 
As the binary dependent variable strategic prospect for the 2015 elections and 
strategic past for the 2010 elections are defined. A vote for the most preferred party is 
coded as 0 and strategic vote is coded as 1. For the 2010 election, I use the actual votes 
of participants in 2010 elections to code the variable. For the 2015 election, it is coded 
with respect to the answer to which party they plan to vote for. It is important to 
remember that pre-election surveys could not predict the result of elections adequately 
for 2015 in UK. Table 3.1.3 converges voter types and constituency types to determine 
who the possible strategic voters are with regard to their constituencies and types of 
their votes. For instance, in constituency type A, the Labour Party voters are possible 
strategic voters. If the second most preferred party of the voter is Conservative Party 
(type 3), her vote for the Conservative Party is defined as a strategic vote but if the 
second most preferred party of voter is the Liberal Democrat Party, then her vote for the 
Liberal Democrats is defined as strategic vote. If she votes for Labour Party, it is 
defined as a sincere vote.  
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   Table 3.1.1: Constituency 
  
 Relative Election Rank of Parties in 
Constituencies 
Strategic Voters Vote for 
A 1-Conservatives 
2-Liberal Democrats 
3-Labour 
Labour Liberal 
Democrats/Conservative
s 
B 1-Liberal Democrats 
2-Conservatives 
3-Labour 
C 1-Labour 
2-Liberal Democrats 
3-Conservatives 
Conservatives Liberal 
Democrats/Labour 
D 1-Liberal Democrats  
2- Labour 
3-Conservatives 
E 1-Labour 
2-Conservatives 
3-Liberal Democrats 
Liberal Democrats Conservatives/Labour 
F 1-Conservatives 
2-Labour 
3-Liberal Democrats 
Labour/Conservatives 
              
         
 
    Table 3.1.2: Preference Order  
Type The most preferred 
party 
Preference Ranking The second most 
preferred party 
1 Conservative CON>LAB>LD Labour 
2 Conservative CON>LD>LAB Liberal Democrats 
3 Labour LAB>CON>LD Conservatives 
4 Labour LAB>LD>CON Liberal Democrats 
5 Liberal Democrats LD>CON>LAB Conservatives 
6 Liberal Democrats LD>LAB>CON Labour 
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  Table 3.1.3: Strategic Voters  
Type of Constituency Type of Voter Most Preferred Party Strategic Vote 
A 3 Labour Conservative 
A 4 Labour Liberal Democrats 
B 3 Labour Conservative 
B 4 Labour Liberal Democrats 
C 1 Conservative Labour 
C 2 Conservative Liberal Democrats 
D 1 Conservative Labour  
D 2 Conservative Liberal Democrats 
E 5 Liberal Democrats Conservative 
E 6 Liberal Democrats Labour 
F 5 Liberal Democrats Conservative  
F 6 Liberal Democrats Labour 
  
3.2 Independent Variables: 
The focus independent variable for this analysis is the satisfaction level of the 
voter from the status-quo. Variable satisfaction is created to measure it as follows. 
Voter’s preference average towards incumbent parties - voter’s preference 
towards her most preferred party. 
So, the equation that determines the satisfaction level of the voter before the 
2010 election is: 
Voter’s preferences towards Labour Party – Voter’s preferences towards her 
most preferred party 
The equation for satisfaction level of voter before the 2015 election is: 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 ’𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦  + 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟’𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠  𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦
2
−
 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟’𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑕𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦    
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The second independent variable is the strategic margin which represents the 
vote share difference between the most preferred and the second most preferred parties 
in constituencies in the 2010 election. It is calculated as: 
Vote share of the most preferred party in voter’s constituency in 2010 election - 
Vote share of the second most preferred party in voter’s constituency in 2010 election 
For the 2015 elections, it represents the voter’s expectation of the vote share 
difference between the most preferred and the second most preferred parties in 
constituencies. So it is calculated as:   
Expected vote share of the most preferred party in voter’s constituency in 2015 
election - Expected vote share of the second most preferred party in voter’s constituency 
in 2015 election 
Also, I created three more independent variables to measure the utilities of the 
voters from the elections with regard to the party that she votes for. The first one is sin 
for the 2015 election and usincereP for the 2010 election which are equal to the 
multiplication of the expected vote share of the most preferred party and her preference 
towards it. This is the utility of the voter when she votes for her most preferred party. 
The second one is str for the 2015 elections and ustrategicP for the 2010 election which 
are equal to the multiplication of the expected vote share of the second most preferred 
party and her preference towards it. The last one is least for the 2015 elections and 
uleastP for the 2010 election which are equal to the multiplication of the expected vote 
share of the least preferred party and her preference towards it.  
3.3 Data Analysis: 
3.3.1 2010 Election: 
First, the results of the analysis for the 2010 UK General Elections will be 
presented. The problem here is that the utility variables are constructed with the data 
from 2015, so there are two assumptions: Preferences of the voters are the same in both 
the 2010 and the 2015 elections and also, the voters’ expectations about the vote shares 
have been quite similar with the election results. Therefore, it is not a robust analysis; 
however, it might give an insight about the relationship between focus independent 
variables and the dependent variable.   
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The table below represents the regression results. The satisfaction level of the 
voter from the status-quo increases her likelihood of voting strategically. It is 
statistically significant for each step. Also, when the utilities that gained from voting for 
the most preferred party and the least preferred party increase; voter’s probability of 
voting strategically decreases. On the other hand, when the utility from voting for the 
second most preferred party increases, voter’s probability of voting strategically 
increases as well. So, results fail to falsify the hypothesis that when voter’s satisfaction 
level increases, her likelihood of voting strategically increases as well.  
      Table 3.3.1.1: Regression 1 
 
3.3.2 2015 Elections: 
To conduct an analysis more discretely, a modification of the dependent variable 
for the 2015 election is made. To operationalize the dependent variable as the likelihood 
of strategic voting, I convert the binary dependent variable to a continuous variable. To 
do that, I use the data from the question about certainty of vote intention. The data set 
contains data that show voters’ certainty about their vote intention in the 2015 election. 
Firstly, I coded the vote for the most preferred party as “-1” and vote for the second 
most preferred party as “1”. Then, I multiply it with the certainty level of the vote with 
regard to the answer of participants to the question about certainty. Options vary 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                    
Number of cases               446             446   
R-squared                                           
                                                    
                           (0.52)          (3.07)   
Constant                   0.0618           1.546***
                                          (-1.99)   
uleastP                                  -0.00295** 
                                           (3.06)   
ustrategicP                               0.00446***
                                          (-2.77)   
usincereP                                -0.00484***
                                          (-3.17)   
Party identification                       -0.651***
                           (6.81)          (7.44)   
satisfaction2010            0.270***        0.345***
strategicpast                                       
                                                    
                              b/t             b/t   
                               M1              M2   
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between 1 and 7 and so, between “I am completely certain” to “I am completely 
uncertain”. Therefore, the dependent variable can take the values between -7 and 7 
except for zero. 7 represents that the participant is completely certain about voting for 
her second most preferred party and -7 represents that she is completely certain about 
voting for her most preferred party. So, when the frequency of the dependent variable 
increases, the likelihood of strategic voting increases as well.  
The table below represents the OLS regression results for the continuous 
dependent variable. The satisfaction level of the voter from the status-quo is statistically 
significant positive effect on her likelihood of voting strategically into the model when 
the effect of party identification is controlled. So, regression results offer some evidence 
for the argument that when the satisfactions level of the voter from the status-quo 
increases, she is more prone to vote strategically. All of the three utility variables have 
statistically significant effects on voter’s likelihood of voting strategically. When the 
utility of voting for the most preferred party and voting for the least preferred party 
increases, voter’s likelihood of voting strategically decreases. Also, as it is expected, 
when the utility of voting for the second most preferred party increases, voter’s 
likelihood of casting a strategic vote increases as well.   
Table 3.3.2.1: Regression 2  
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                    
Number of cases               373             348             348   
R-squared                  0.0316           0.171           0.192   
                                                                    
                          (-8.42)         (-7.68)         (-8.28)   
Constant                   -3.310***       -5.353***       -6.439***
                                                           (3.01)   
Party identification                                        0.880***
                                          (-1.39)         (-2.06)   
least                                    -0.00288        -0.00432** 
                                           (7.38)          (6.76)   
str                                        0.0110***       0.0102***
                                          (-3.96)         (-4.08)   
sin                                      -0.00659***     -0.00671***
                           (3.48)          (1.40)          (1.99)   
satisfaction2015            0.342***        0.161           0.232** 
                                                                    
                              b/t             b/t             b/t   
                               M1              M2              M3   
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Results for the same analysis with the binary dependent variable are presented 
below. For the satisfaction level of the voter, results are again statistically significant in 
the model at p<0.10 when party identification is controlled for. However, any 
significant effect of the utility of voting for the least preferred party disappears in this 
analysis.   
Table 3.3.2.2: Regression 3  
 
In the second group of the analysis, rather than utilities, independent control 
variables signify the level of preferences towards parties. Table 3.3.2.3  below 
represents the regression results for the continuous dependent variable. The satisfaction 
of the voter has a statistically significant positive effect on voter’s likelihood of voting 
strategically again when the party identification of the voter is controlled for. Also, the 
difference between the expected vote shares of the second most preferred party and 
expected vote share of the most preferred party is statistically significant in each level 
of analysis. So, when this margin increases, the voter’s likelihood of voting strategically 
increases as well. Effects of level of preferences towards parties are statistically 
significant as well. When the preferences towards the most preferred party and the least 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                    
Number of cases               374             349             349   
R-squared                                                           
                                                                    
                          (-4.44)         (-4.68)         (-4.94)   
Constant                   -1.127***       -2.462***       -3.101***
                                                           (2.24)   
Party identification                                        0.463** 
                                          (-1.21)         (-1.64)   
least                                    -0.00181        -0.00262   
                                           (5.80)          (5.42)   
str                                       0.00641***      0.00608***
                                          (-2.94)         (-3.00)   
sin                                      -0.00347***     -0.00370***
                           (2.55)          (1.45)          (1.67)   
satisfaction2015            0.196**         0.141           0.167*  
strategicprospect                                                   
                                                                    
                              b/t             b/t             b/t   
                               M1              M2              M3   
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preferred party increase; the voter’s probability of voting strategically decreases. On the 
other hand, when the voter’s preference towards the second most preferred party 
increases; her likelihood of voting strategically increases as well. Party identification is 
again included to control for unobserved effects of being a sincere voter of a particular 
party. 
Table 3.3.2.3: Regression 4 
 
Table 3.3.2.4 represents the regression analysis for the binary dependent 
variable. The difference between the expected vote shares of the second most preferred 
party and the expected vote share of the most preferred party is again statistically 
significant in each level of analysis. Effect of satisfaction of the voter on voter’s 
likelihood of voting strategically is statistically significant again if only party 
identification is controlled for.  
. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                                    
Number of cases               373             371             371             371   
R-squared                  0.0316           0.129           0.185           0.209   
                                                                                    
                          (-8.42)        (-10.92)         (-4.96)         (-5.84)   
Constant                   -3.310***       -5.119***       -4.961***       -6.080***
                                                                           (3.34)   
Party identification                                                        0.920***
                                                          (-2.02)         (-2.66)   
thirdlike                                                  -0.302**        -0.400***
                                                           (3.57)          (3.00)   
secondlike                                                  0.465***        0.392***
                                                          (-3.82)         (-3.48)   
affiliationm                                               -1.221***       -1.103***
                                           (6.41)          (6.59)          (6.51)   
strategicmarpro                            0.0488***       0.0488***       0.0476***
                           (3.48)          (3.54)          (1.18)          (2.00)   
satisfaction2015            0.342***        0.331***        0.140           0.244** 
                                                                                    
                              b/t             b/t             b/t             b/t   
                               M1              M2              M3              M4   
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               Table 3.3.2.4: Regression 5 
 
3.4 Discussion: 
All these regression results give some insight about the relationship between the 
voter’s satisfaction level from the status-quo and her probability of voting strategically. 
For the 2015 election, there is a positive correlation between the satisfaction level and 
the probability of strategic voting which is statistically significant, but when utilities or 
preferences towards parties are controlled for, the significance level drops just below 
p<0.1 level. On the other hand, when the most preferred party of the voters also 
controlled for, the satisfaction level again becomes statistically significant. What might 
be the possible effect of the most preferred party of the voter on strategic voting? 
Actually, when one looks at the aggregate data, the Conservative party’s voters have 
much lower levels of strategic voting than Labour and Liberal Democrats and their level 
of strategic voting do not change so much in between the 2010 and the 2015 elections. It 
seems that there are some characteristics of the conservative voters which prevent them 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                                    
Number of cases               374             372             372             372   
R-squared                                                                           
                                                                                    
                          (-4.44)         (-6.39)         (-3.86)         (-4.38)   
Constant                   -1.127***       -2.536***       -3.204***       -3.971***
                                                                           (2.64)   
Party identification                                                        0.552***
                                                          (-2.09)         (-2.47)   
thirdlike                                                  -0.236**        -0.294** 
                                                           (3.76)          (3.31)   
secondlike                                                  0.409***        0.367***
                                                          (-2.64)         (-2.48)   
affiliationm                                               -0.660***       -0.624** 
                                           (5.52)          (5.42)          (5.39)   
strategicmarpro                            0.0334***       0.0350***       0.0356***
                           (2.55)          (2.62)          (1.31)          (1.69)   
satisfaction2015            0.196**         0.222***        0.143           0.192*  
strategicprospect                                                                   
                                                                                    
                              b/t             b/t             b/t             b/t   
                               M1              M2              M3              M4   
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from voting strategically. It is not about the level of affiliation towards the most 
preferred party. The mean value of the party affiliation for conservative voters towards 
their most preferred party is 7.79 with standard deviation 1.44 where the mean value of 
Labour voters is 7.66 with standard deviation 1.59 and the mean value of Liberal 
Democrat voters is 7.51. Also, it is not about the level of affiliation towards the second 
most preferred party because the mean value of the affiliation towards the second most 
preferred party of conservative voters is 4.02 with standard deviation 1.76 where the 
mean value of Labour voters is 3.85 with standard deviation 1.84. Therefore, there 
might be an unobserved characteristic of conservative voters that may prevent them 
from voting strategically.    
 For the 2010 elections, the results for the satisfaction level are more 
straightforward, but as it was discussed, since preference variables corresponds to the 
2015 answers, there is an assumption that voters’ preferences have not changed between 
2010 and 2015. Although, it decreases the robustness of the analysis; the findings still 
support the main hypothesis of this study. Actually, the data set contains the casted vote 
of subjects in the 2005 elections. The satisfaction level of 2005 significantly affects the 
probability of strategic voting at p<0.01 level.  
Finally, the expected vote share difference between the second most preferred 
party and the most preferred party increases voter’s probability of voting strategically as 
it was expected. Also, both the utility variables and preference variables affect 
likelihood of voting strategically significantly in an expected way.      
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion: 
Applying prospect theory to analyze strategic voting provides a new insight 
namely that the satisfaction level of the voter from the status-quo increases the 
probability of strategic voting. Experimental results support the first hypothesis that 
voters whose most preferred candidate is the incumbent are more prone to vote 
strategically than voters whose least preferred candidate is the incumbent. Also, a 
comparison of groups supports this argument for aggregate level data. So, the 
incumbent candidate loses more support than the opposition candidate because of 
strategic voting. Comparison between voters whose most preferred candidate is the 
incumbent and voters whose least preferred candidate is the incumbent has a specific 
mechanism. Since voters whose most preferred candidate is the incumbent, are in a loss 
frame or at the reference point for any outcome of the election; the utility difference 
between strategic voting and sincere voting is higher than voters whose least preferred 
candidate is the incumbent. Voters whose the least preferred candidate is the incumbent 
are in a gain frame or at the reference point for any outcome of election. Therefore, the 
utility difference between strategic voting and sincere voting is lower for them. 
Beyond this specific mechanism, prospect theory predicts that when the 
satisfaction level of the voter from the status-quo increases, the voter’s probability of 
voting strategically increases as well. This is the focus hypothesis of this study. 
Analyses of the BES data sets for the 2010 and the 2015 elections provide some support 
to affirm this hypothesis. The aim of strategic voting is to prevent the loss of the 
satisfaction level of the voter by means of lowering the chance of the least preferred 
party from becoming the incumbent. On the other hand, the motivation behind sincere 
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voting is to increase the satisfaction level gain by increasing the chance of the most 
preferred party to become the incumbent or stay as the incumbent. When the 
satisfaction level increases, the voter faces more loss and less gain. If it is combined 
with loss aversion, when voter’s satisfaction level increases; the voter’s probability of 
voting strategically as the option to avoid loss, increases as well.  
Also, results from the data analysis supports the argument that the expected vote 
share margin between the second most preferred party and the most preferred party, 
which is one of the most prominent findings of the strategic voting literature, increases 
the voter’s probability of strategic voting. However, experimental data did not reveal 
this relationship; it might be because, the independent variable is binary as it was 
discussed in chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, results in chapter 2 suggest that sufficiently a high margin between 
the second most preferred candidate and most preferred candidate decreases the effect 
of whether the incumbent candidate is her most preferred candidate or her least 
preferred candidate on strategic voting. Results are the same for the aggregate level as 
well.    
4.1 Discussion: 
An important caution about the mundane realism of the experiment should be 
made. Experimental design cannot include the strength of party affiliation which is a 
determinant of strategic voting in real life into the analysis. Also, as it was indicated, 
there is not a significant correlation between the strength of the voter’s party affiliation 
in real life and the probability of strategic voting in the experiment. So, subjects do not 
transpose strength of their party affiliation in experimental setting. One of the findings 
from the analysis of BES survey data is that when the strength of party affiliation and 
preferences included into analysis, they decrease the effect of the satisfaction level from 
the status-quo. Therefore, it is the basic weakness of the experiment in this study. 
However, the experiment provides leverage of controlling unobserved determinants of 
strategic voting. 
There might be possible improvement in terms of methodology and extensions. 
Time-series cross-sectional data might be better suited to test the effects of the 
satisfaction level on voter’s probability of strategic voting. Including different countries 
and elections improves the rigor of the analysis, but since just subset of voters are 
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possible strategic voters and strategic voting should be preference and constituency 
specific, the coding procedure of such analysis is extremely complex.  
In terms of extensions, such relationship might be tested for different electoral 
rules rather than the single member district plurality rule. It is possible that such a 
relationship may occur under different electoral rules. Of course, such an analysis may 
require defining different reference points. It may be helpful to extend the reference 
point argument for different consideration.   
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Appendix A 
Pre-test Survey: 
 
Aşağıdaki soruları cevaplayınız: 
1- Yaşınız? 
 
2- Cinsiyetinizi belirtiniz.    
A-Erkek       B-Kadın 
 
3- Aylık gelirinizin bulunduğu aralığı belirtiniz. 
A- 0-1000TL. 
B- 1000- 2500TL. 
C- 2500- 5000TL. 
D-5000TL ve üzeri. 
 
4- Mesleğinizi yazınız. 
 
5- Eğitim düzeyinizi belirtiniz. 
A- İlkokul 
B- Ortaokul 
C- Lise 
D- Üniversite 
E- Lisansüstü 
 
65 
 
6- Medeni halinizi belirtiniz.   
A-Evli       B-Bekar 
 
7- Bir önceki genel seçimlerde oy kullandınız mı?                  
A-Evet         B-Hayır 
 
8- Önümüzdeki genel seçimlerde oy kullanmayı düşünüyor musunuz? 
A- Evet        B-Hayır 
 
9- Kendinizi herhangi bir siyasi partiye bağlı hissediyor musunuz?  Bağlılık düzeyinizi 
aşağıdakilerden hangisi en iyi tanımlar? 
A- Sıkı sıkıya bağlıyım. 
B- Bağlıyım. 
C- Kısmen bağlıyım. 
D- Hiç bir partiye bağlı değilim. 
 
10- En çok kullandığınız haber kaynağı: 
A- Gazete          B- TV        C- Online haber siteleri     D- Sosyal medya          E- Diğer: 
 
11- Alış-veriş yaptığınız bir mağazanın ödeme sırasında size aşağıdaki indirm 
seçenekleri sunduğunu düşünün; 
A- Etiket fiyatı üzerinden koşulsuz %10 indirim.  
ya da, 
B- Kasiyerin yapacağı yazı-tura atışında eğer yazı gelirse etiket fiyatı üzerinden %20 
indirim tura gelirse indirimsiz etiket fiyatı. 
Hangi seçeneği tercih ederdiniz?  Seçtiğiniz şıkkı işaretleyiniz. 
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Group 1 
Ülkenizde başkanlık seçiminin yaklaşmakta olduğunu farzedin. Seçime Fatih 
Evren, Ali Yılmaz ve İrfan Gürkaynak başkan adayı olarak katılacaktır. Fatih Evren, 
ülkenin şu anki başkanıdır. Seçimde en fazla oyu alacak olan aday ülkenin yeni başkanı 
olacaktır. 
İzlediği politikalarla ve savunduğu görüşler ile bir önceki seçimde de oy vermiş 
olduğunuz Fatih Evren size en yakın adaydır. Fatih Evren şu anda başkalık koltuğuda 
oturmaktadır. 
İkinci aday Ali Yılmaz’ın savunduğu bazı politikalara karşı olsanızda belli başlı 
fikirleri sizin görüşlerinizle uyuşmaktadır. İrfan Gürkaynak’a göre fikirleri ve vaad 
ettiği politikalar sizin için daha makuldür.    
Diğer aday İrfan Gürkaynak sizin fikirlerinize tamamen zıt görüşlere sahiptir. 
Seçimi kazanması ülkenin istemediğiniz şekilde yönetilmesine sebep olacaktır. 
Seçimlerden yaklaşık bir ay önce, üç farklı araştırma şirketi, adayların seçimde 
alacakları oy oranlarını belirleyebilmek  için yaptıkları anketlerde aşağıdaki sonuçlara 
ulaşmışlardır.   
Araştırma Şirketi A’nın oy oranı tahminleri : 
Başkan Fatih Evren: %28.4         Ali Yılmaz: %35.5        İrfan Gürkaynak: % 36.1 
Araştırma Şirketi B’nin oy oranı tahminleri: 
Başkan Fatih Evren: %26.2         Ali Yılmaz: %36.7        İrfan Gürkaynak: %37.1 
Araştırma Şirketi C’nin oy oranı tahminleri: 
Başkan Fatih Evren: %29.7         Ali Yılmaz: %34.9        İrfan Gürkaynak: %36.4        
 
Yukarıda verilen bilgilerle seçimde hangi adaya oy verirdiniz? Yanındaki kutucuğu 
işaretleyiniz. 
 Kesinlikle Başkan Fatih Evren’e oy verirdim. 
 Muhtemelen Başkan Fatih Evren’e oy verirdim. 
 Kararsız kalırdım. 
 Muhtemelen Ali Yılmaz’a oy verirdim. 
 Kesinlikle Ali Yılmaz’a oy verirdim. 
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             İrfan Gürkaynak’a oy verirdim 
 Oy Kullanmazdım 
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Group 2 
Ülkenizde başkanlık seçiminin yaklaşmakta olduğunu farzedin. Seçime Fatih 
Evren, Ali Yılmaz ve İrfan Gürkaynak başkan adayı olarak katılacaktır. İrfan 
Gürkaynak, ülkenin şu anki başkanıdır. Seçimde en fazla oyu alacak olan aday ülkenin 
yeni başkanı olacaktır. 
İzlediği politikalarla ve savunduğu görüşler ile bir önceki seçimde de oy vermiş 
olduğunuz Fatih Evren size en yakın adaydır.  
İkinci aday Ali Yılmaz’ın savunduğu bazı politikalara karşı olsanızda belli başlı 
fikirleri sizin görüşlerinizle uyuşmaktadır. İrfan Gürkaynak’a göre fikirleri ve vaad 
ettiği politikalar sizin için daha makuldür.    
İrfan Gürkaynak sizin fikirlerinize tamamen zıt görüşlere sahiptir. Seçimi 
kazanması ülkenin istemediğiniz şekilde yönetilmesine sebep olacaktır. İrfan 
Gürkaynak şu anda başkanlık koltuğunda oturmaktadır. 
Seçimlerden yaklaşık bir ay önce, üç farklı araştırma şirketi, adayların seçimde 
alacakları oy oranlarını belirleyebilmek için yaptıkları anketlerde aşağıdaki sonuçlara 
ulaşmışlardır.   
Araştırma Şirketi A’nın oy oranı tahminleri : 
Fatih Evren: %28.4         Ali Yılmaz: %35.5      Başkan İrfan Gürkaynak: % 36.1 
Araştırma Şirketi B’nin oy oranı tahminleri: 
Fatih Evren: %26.2         Ali Yılmaz: %36.7      Başkan İrfan Gürkaynak: %37.1 
Araştırma Şirketi C’nin oy oranı tahminleri: 
Fatih Evren: %29.7         Ali Yılmaz: %34.9      Başkan İrfan Gürkaynak: %36.4        
 
Yukarıda verilen bilgilerle seçimde hangi adaya oy verirdiniz? Yanındaki kutucuğu 
işaretleyiniz. 
 Kesinlikle Fatih Evren’e oy verirdim. 
 Muhtemelen Fatih Evren’e oy verirdim. 
 Kararsız kalırdım. 
 Muhtemelen Ali Yılmaz’a oy verirdim. 
 Kesinlikle Ali Yılmaz’a oy verirdim. 
             Başkan İrfan Gürkaynak’a oy verirdim 
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 Oy Kullanmazdım 
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Group 3 
Ülkenizde başkanlık seçiminin yaklaşmakta olduğunu farzedin. Seçime Fatih 
Evren, Ali Yılmaz ve İrfan Gürkaynak başkan adayı olarak katılacaktır. Fatih Evren, 
ülkenin şu anki başkanıdır. Tek tur üzerinden yapılacak seçimde en fazla oy alan aday 
ülkenin yeni başkanı olacaktır. 
İzlediği politikalarla ve savunduğu görüşler ile bir önceki seçimde de oy vermiş 
olduğunuz Fatih Evren size en yakın adaydır. Fatih Evren şu an başkanlık koltuğunda 
oturmaktadır. 
İkinci aday Ali Yılmaz’ın savunduğu bazı politikalara karşı olsanız da belli başlı 
fikirleri sizin görüşlerinizle uyuşmaktadır. İrfan Gürkaynak’a göre fikirleri ve vaad 
ettiği politikalar sizin için daha makuldür. 
Diğer aday İrfan Gürkaynak sizin fikirlerinize tamamen zıt görüşlere sahiptir. 
Seçimi kazanması ülkenin istemediğiniz şekilde yönetilmesine sebep olacaktır. 
Seçimlerden yaklaşık bir ay önce, üç farklı araştırma şirketi, adayların seçimde 
alacakları oy oranlarını belirleyebilmek için yaptıkları anketlerde aşağıdaki sonuçlara 
ulaşmışlardır. 
Araştırma Şirketi A’nın oy oranı tahminleri : 
Başkan Fatih Evren: %18.4          Ali Yılmaz: %40.5         İrfan Gürkaynak: % 41.1 
Araştırma Şirketi B’nin oy oranı tahminleri: 
Başkan Fatih Evren: %16.2          Ali Yılmaz: %41.7               İrfan Gürkaynak: %42.1 
Araştırma Şirketi C’nin oy oranı tahminleri: 
Başkan Fatih Evren: %19.7          Ali Yılmaz: %39.9               İrfan Gürkaynak: %41.4        
 
Yukarıda verilen bilgilerle seçimde hangi adaya oy verirdiniz? Yanındaki kutucuğu 
işaretleyiniz. 
 Kesinlikle Başkan Fatih Evren’e oy verirdim. 
 Muhtemelen Başkan Fatih Evren’e oy verirdim. 
 Kararsız kalırdım. 
 Muhtemelen Ali Yılmaz’a oy verirdim. 
 Kesinlikle Ali Yılmaz’a oy verirdim. 
             İrfan Gürkaynak’a oy verirdim 
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 Oy Kullanmazdım 
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Group 4 
Ülkenizde başkanlık seçiminin yaklaşmakta olduğunu farzedin. Seçime Fatih 
Evren, Ali Yılmaz ve İrfan Gürkaynak başkan adayı olarak katılacaktır. İrfan 
Gürkaynak, ülkenin şu anki başkanıdır. Tek tur üzerinden yapılacak seçimde en fazla oy 
alan aday ülkenin yeni başkanı olacaktır. 
İzlediği politikalarla ve savunduğu görüşler ile bir önceki seçimde de oy vermiş 
olduğunuz Fatih Evren size en yakın adaydır.  
İkinci aday Ali Yılmaz’ın savunduğu bazı politikalara karşı olsanız da belli başlı 
fikirleri sizin görüşlerinizle uyuşmaktadır. İrfan Gürkaynak’a göre fikirleri ve vaad 
ettiği politikalar sizin için daha makuldür. 
Diğer aday İrfan Gürkaynak sizin fikirlerinize tamamen zıt görüşlere sahiptir. 
Seçimi kazanması ülkenin istemediğiniz şekilde yönetilmesine sebep olacaktır. İrfan 
Gürkaynak şu an başkanlık koltuğunda oturmaktadır. 
Seçimlerden yaklaşık bir ay önce, üç farklı araştırma şirketi, adayların seçimde 
alacakları oy oranlarını belirleyebilmek için yaptıkları anketlerde aşağıdaki sonuçlara 
ulaşmışlardır. 
 Araştırma Şirketi A’nın oy oranı tahminleri : 
Fatih Evren: %18.4          Ali Yılmaz: %40.5               Başkan İrfan Gürkaynak: % 41.1 
Araştırma Şirketi B’nin oy oranı tahminleri: 
Fatih Evren: %16.2          Ali Yılmaz: %41.7               Başkan İrfan Gürkaynak: %42.1 
Araştırma Şirketi C’nin oy oranı tahminleri: 
Fatih Evren: %19.7          Ali Yılmaz: %39.9               Başkan İrfan Gürkaynak: %41.4       
 
Yukarıda verilen bilgilerle seçimde hangi adaya oy verirdiniz? Yanındaki kutucuğu 
işaretleyiniz. 
 Kesinlikle Fatih Evren’e oy verirdim. 
 Muhtemelen Fatih Evren’e oy verirdim. 
 Kararsız kalırdım. 
 Muhtemelen Ali Yılmaz’a oy verirdim. 
 Kesinlikle Ali Yılmaz’a oy verirdim. 
             Başkan İrfan Gürkaynak’a oy verirdim 
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 Oy Kullanmazdım 
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Group Characteristics: 
Group 1: 
 
Group 2: 
 
Group 3: 
 
Group 4: 
 
 
        risk          77    .1688312    .3770592          0          1
      partya          77    1.935065    .9505907          0          4
         sex          77    .3376623    .4760139          0          1
   education          77     3.12987     1.28094          1          5
         age          77    33.67532    14.00699         19         71
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
        risk          81    .1604938    .4017708         -1          1
      partya          81    1.864198     1.00937          0          4
         sex          81    .4074074    .4944132          0          1
   education          81    3.432099    1.071661          1          5
         age          81    33.62963    12.85928         19         66
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
        risk          69    .1304348    .3392485          0          1
      partya          70    2.085714    .9592095          1          4
         sex          70    .3714286    .4866755          0          1
   education          70         3.5    .9743076          1          4
         age          70    31.82857     12.8998         19         65
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
        risk          73    .2465753    .4340002          0          1
      partya          73    1.890411    1.048301          1          4
         sex          73    .1917808    .3964262          0          1
   education          73    3.205479    1.189758          1          4
         age          73    33.65753    13.87666         18         71
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Appendix B 
 
Data set that is used in third chapter is the fourth wave of British Election 
Studies Internet Panel that contains 16629 participants. It is conducted in March 2015 as 
an online survey by British Election Studies. It is retrieved from 
http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/ 
Below, you can find the questions which are used to measure several variables in 
data analysis: 
 
1- To measure preferences of participants for parties, following questions is 
used: 
How much do you like or dislike each of the following parties? (Participants’ answers 
suppose to vary between 1 to 10 where 1 represents strongly dislike and 10 represent 
strongly like for each party) 
  
2- To measure vote intention of participants, the following question is used: 
If there were a UK General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?  
 
3- To measure certainty of vote which converts binary dependent variable into 
continuous dependent variable; the following question is used: 
You said that you would be most likely to vote for ..................in a General Election. 
How certain are you that you would vote for this party?  
 
4- To measure voter’s expectations about vote shares of parties in their 
constituencies, participants’ answers for following question is used:  
How likely is it that each of these parties will win the General Election in your 
constituency?(participants’ answers suppose to vary between 0 to 100 for each party) 
 
Also, below you can find the descriptive statistics for probable strategic voters’ 
satisfaction levels from status-quo:  
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     Total         126        152         96         374 
                                                        
       -.5          13          1         17          31 
        -1          21          1         14          36 
      -1.5          21          3         16          40 
        -2          25          4         12          41 
      -2.5          14         12         10          36 
        -3          13          6          7          26 
      -3.5          11         14          9          34 
        -4           3         13          6          22 
      -4.5           4         17          3          24 
        -5           1          7          2          10 
      -5.5           0         10          0          10 
        -6           0         12          0          12 
      -6.5           0         19          0          19 
        -7           0          8          0           8 
      -7.5           0          9          0           9 
        -8           0          4          0           4 
      -8.5           0          1          0           1 
        -9           0          3          0           3 
      -9.5           0          8          0           8 
                                                        
    on2015   Conservat     Labour  Liberal D       Total
satisfacti         Party identification
     Total         317         57         374 
                                             
       -.5          23          8          31 
        -1          29          7          36 
      -1.5          34          6          40 
        -2          34          7          41 
      -2.5          30          6          36 
        -3          24          2          26 
      -3.5          26          8          34 
        -4          18          4          22 
      -4.5          21          3          24 
        -5           9          1          10 
      -5.5          10          0          10 
        -6           9          3          12 
      -6.5          18          1          19 
        -7           8          0           8 
      -7.5           8          1           9 
        -8           4          0           4 
      -8.5           1          0           1 
        -9           3          0           3 
      -9.5           8          0           8 
                                             
    on2015           0          1       Total
satisfacti     strategicprospect
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